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MICHAEL W. McCONNELL
ESTABLISHMENT AND TOLERATION IN
EDMUND BURKE'S "CONSTITUTION
OF FREEDOM"
The most memorable voices in American Founding-era debates
over relations between church and state were raised in support of
disestablishment and full and equal freedom of conscience. States-
men such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, as well as evan-
gelical leaders such as John Leland and Isaac Backus, made argu-
ments against establishment and in favor of full and equal rights
of religious conscience in terms of enduring principles of civil and
religious liberty. Their words continue to inspire and guide our
consideration of these weighty and contentious questions. There
were, of course, other voices. Some patriotic and revered leaders,
such as George Washington and Patrick Henry, thought full dis-
establishment a dangerous course for a republic in need of every
support for public virtue. But their arguments have had little effect
on the course of church-state affairs in the United States.
A parallel debate proceeded in Great Britain at the same time
(the 1760s to the 1790s), but it took on a different character and
reached a different conclusion. In those debates, the outstanding
figure was Edmund Burke. Burke presents a profound alternative
William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
AuTHoR's NoTE: The author is grateful to Albert Alschuler, Thomas Berg, Gerard Brad-
ley, Joseph Cropsey, David Currie, Stephen Gilles, Philip Hamburger, Gareth Jones, Elena
Kagan, Dan Kahan, Ralph Lerner, Martin Marty, Mary McConnell, Daniel Ritchie, and
Stephen Schulhofer for helpful comments on an earlier draft; to Jeffrey Seitzer for research
assistance; and to the Morton C. Seeley Endowment Fund and the Arnold and Frieda Shure
Research Fund for financial support during the preparation of this article.
o 1996 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0-226-36312-0/96/1995-0008502.00
394 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
to the American resolution of the church-state problem-but one
equally grounded in liberal constitutionalism. At a time when the
American constitutional principles of nonestablishment and free
exercise are thought by many to be mired in a contradiction that
the Supreme Court seems unable to resolve, it is instructive to see
how Burke sought to reconcile the principles of establishment and
toleration, and how he understood both to fit into the wider
framework of his "constitution of freedom."'
Burke is best known for his views on representation, party poli-
tics, the French and American Revolutions, and the value of tradi-
tion. His contribution to the church-state question has received
relatively little scholarly attention.2 Yet establishment and tolera-
tion occupied Burke's attention throughout his forty years as a
statesman and man of letters, and arguably were the most impor-
tant elements in his understanding of British constitutionalism. His
first published work, A Vindication of Natural Society,3 was a satirical
defense of revealed religion against the attacks of Lord Boling-
broke, and his last, the Letters on a Regicide Peace,4 traced the enor-
mities of the French Revolution to the aggressive atheism of the
philosophes.
The term "constitution of freedom" comes from Burke's great speech to his disgruntled
constituents at Bristol, in which he defended his support for the Catholic Relief Act in the
wake of the anti-Catholic Gordon riots. Edmund Burke, Speech at Bristol, Previous to the
Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 The Works of the Right Honorable Ednmund Burke 365, 416 (Little,
Brown, 9th ed 1889) ("Works").
To date, there has been no comprehensive study of Burke's principles in the field of
religion and government. The most comprehensive study of Burke's political theology is
Francis Canavan's Edmund Burke: Prescription and Providence (Carolina, 1987), but Canavan
addresses the constitutional issues of toleration and establishment only in passing. A useful
analysis of Burke's theory of establishment may be found in John MacCunn, The Political
Philosophy of Edmund Burke 122-43 (Arnold, 1913), reprinted as Religion and Politics in Daniel
E. Ritchie, ed, Edmund Burke: Appraisals and Applications 183 (Transaction, 1990). As this
article went to press, Norman Ravitch published an instructive essay, Far Short of Bigotry:
Edmund Burke on Church Establishment and Confessional States, 10 J Church and State 365
(1995). Ursula Henriques devotes a chapter of her Religious Toleration in England 1787-
1833 99-135 (Toronto, 1961) to Burke's role in the development of British church-state
doctrine, as does J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 247-58 (Cambridge, 1985), but
neither attempts to reconcile Burke's twin principles of toleration and establishment. Clark,
indeed, treats Burke as an unreconstructed "champion of the Anglican aristocratic-monar-
chical regime," dismissing his advocacy of a broad toleration as evidence of an "early radi-
calism" abandoned by the mature Burke. Id at 250. As will become clear, I think this
interpretation is untenable.
I Edmund Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society (1756), in 1 Works 1.
4 Edmund Burke, Three Letters to a Member of Parliament on the Proposals for Peace with
the Regicide Directoy of France (1796-97), in 5 Works 231 ("Letters on a Regicide Peace");
[1995
ESTABLISHMENT AND TOLERATION 395
Burke offers a sharp contrast to the Americans. Whatever the
differences among the various American approaches to church-
state issues, all stress the dangers and incapacities of government
and the primacy of individual conscience, and most see problems
in the inherent divisiveness of religion. Burke had a more benign
view of government, a more institutional view of religious experi-
ence, and a greater awareness of the potential of organized religion
to serve as a corrective to extremism and abuse of power.
Most striking is the difference over church-state separation.
While Americans disagree over such issues as the conduct of the
public schools, the participation of religious groups in govern-
ment-funded programs, and the accommodation of religious mi-
norities, almost every school of thought in America now adheres
to one version or another of church-state "separation."' Burke, by
contrast, maintained that "in a Christian commonwealth the
Church and the State are one and the same thing, being different
integral parts of the same whole." 6 The established church, he said,
is "the foundation of [the] whole constitution. '
At the same time, Burke was in the forefront of efforts to achieve
a broader toleration for Roman Catholics and other Dissenters
from the established church. He stated that "[i]f ever there was
anything to which, from reason, nature, habit, and principle, I am
totally averse, it is persecution for conscientious difference in opin-
ion."'8 This was not just talk. For the cause of toleration, Burke
suffered frequent political calumny, lost his seat in Parliament, and
was even threatened by a mob of anti-Catholic rioters. The cause
of toleration inspired some of his most moving oratory and some
of his most persistent and persuasive correspondence.
Are these twin attachments-to toleration and to establish-
ment-incompatible? From the American perspective, it would
seem so, and scholars have attributed these positions to different
Edmund Burke, Fourth Letter on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France
(1795-97), in 6 Works 1.
5 See Carl H. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary American
Thought 1986 BYU L Rev 371; Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing
the Disestabhlisment Decision, 67 Tex L Rev 955 (1989).
6Edmund Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39,
43.
7 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 87 (Hackett, 1987) (J. G. A. Po-
cock, ed) (originally published 1790) ("Reflections").
I Edmund Burke, Speech on the Acts of Uniformity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 1, 10.
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periods of Burke's career.' But Burke did not see it that way. For
him the establishment was not an instrument of intolerance or op-
pression, but of moderation, restraint, and even toleration. "Zeal-
ous as I am for the principle of an establishment," he proclaimed
in his Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters, "so just
an abhorrence do I conceive against whatever may shake it. I know
nothing but the supposed necessity of persecution that can make
an establishment disgusting. I would have toleration a part of es-
tablishment, as a principle favorable to Christianity, and as a part
of Christianity."'" Indeed, he considered the religious establish-
ment not antithetical to, but an integral part of, England's system
of civil liberty-much as he saw the monarchy and the nobility as
integral to England's system of political liberty.
His instincts were confirmed when the revolutionaries in France
simultaneously disestablished the Church and persecuted religious
believers, and when the persecution of Catholics in Ireland drove
that essentially conservative nation into Jacobinesque rebellion. He
perceived that both establishment and toleration were obstacles to
revolutionary tyranny, and that both were necessary elements of
England's balanced constitution.
It is Burke's understanding of the symbiosis between establish-
ment and toleration-so antithetical to the disestablishmentari-
anism of America-that most interests me here. Where it is help-
ful, I will compare Burke's ideas to doctrines and controversies in
the American treatment of church and state; but this should not
be taken to imply that Burke's ideas should-or even could-be
transported to these shores. For Burke, moral and constitutional
questions are always contextual, not to be governed by "abstrac-
tions and universals."'" He advocated keeping the established
church only "in the degree it exists, and in no greater,"12 and based
his support in large part on the dispositions and attachments of
the people of England. The English obviously differ in these re-
spects from the more diverse and sectarian Americans. On Burkean
9 See Clark, English Society at 250 (cited in note 2).
o Edmund Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in
7 Works 21, 25.
" Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 41. See
also Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57, 109.
" Burke, Reflections at 80.
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principles, America could not have an established church. Burke's
analysis of the issues nonetheless may help us to appreciate the
complexities-even the paradoxes-of these difficult issues.
I. BuKE, THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN
A. BURKE'S RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND AND BELIEFS
Burke was born in 1729 in Ireland of Catholic stock, at a time
when the Penal Laws kept the Catholic majority in submission to
the Protestant minority, called the "Ascendancy." Burke's mother,
a nominal convert to the established church, was a practicing Cath-
olic; Burke's beloved wife, Jane, was the same. Burke's father, a
lawyer, converted to Anglicanism as a young man, seven years be-
fore Edmund's birth, apparently to enable him to practice his pro-
fession, which was at that time closed to Catholics. 3 Edmund him-
self never had to face that wrenching choice between his faith and
his civil liberty, for he was baptized and raised in the (Anglican)
Church of Ireland. He attended a rural Catholic school as a boy,
a Quaker school in his youth, and institutions of the established
church (Trinity College, Dublin, followed by the Inns of Court)
for higher education. As an adult, Burke came to epitomize and
to champion the English nation, the Anglican Church, and the
Whig Party-the party of the Protestant settlement in 1688. That
was his public face. But through his ties to the despised race of
Irish Catholics, Burke had personal experience of religious perse-
cution. His most recent biographer, Conor Cruise O'Brien, specu-
lates that Burke's commitment to Catholic emancipation in Ireland
(as well as his fight "against abuse of power in America, in India,
and, at the end, above all, in France") was inspired by "the humili-
ating discovery of his father's having conformed, out of fear" and
"the realisation that his own achievement would be based on the
consequences of that act of conforming.' 14
There is little doubt that Burke was a committed and devout
Christian. His editorJ. G. A. Pocock calls him "the pious Burke,""
13 It is not certain that the "Richard Burke" who converted to Anglicanism in 1722 was
the same Richard Burke who was Edmund's father, but the evidence, which is presented
in Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology
of Edmund Burke 3-6 (Chicago, 1992) ("The Great Melody"), seems compelling.
14 Id at 13-14.
15J. G. A. Pocock, Editor's Introduction, in Burke, Reflections at vii, xviii.
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and O'Brien says he was a "devout Christian."' 16 Burke fervently
believed that "atheism is against, not only our reason, but our in-
stincts,"' 7 and his speeches and writings are filled with references
to the divine order and judgment. In a letter to his fourteen-year-
old son, Richard, who was studying in France, Burke urged him
to keep himself "constantly" in the presence of God. "Remember
[h]im first, and last, and midst."18
Although suspected of secret Catholicism for most of his life
(political cartoons usually depicted Burke in the robes of a Jesuit,
and at critical junctures in his political career Burke's enemies ac-
cused him of being a Jesuit and a Jacobite'9), most evidence sug-
gests that he loyally adhered to the Anglican faith adopted, how-
ever opportunistically, by his father.2" He faithfully attended
Anglican services, he regularly took sacraments from Anglican
priests, his library was filled with orthodox Anglican theological
works, and his writings on the role of church and providence in
the life of the nation were deeply imbued with Anglican theology.
In the Reflections on the Revolution in France, he declared: "We [the
English] are Protestants, not from indifference, but from zeal.'
But Burke's faith was not at all sectarian. In his own words, to
a friend: "I am attached to Christianity at large; much from con-
viction; more from affection. ' 22 In this letter-his most explicit
16 O'Brien, The Great Melody at 588 (cited in note 13). Similarly, Burke's nineteenth-
century biographer, Thomas MacKnight, described him as "sincerely attached to the princi-
ples of the Christian religion." Thomas MacKnight, 3 Histoyy of the Life and Times of Edmund
Burke 164 (London, 1860) ("Life and Times"). Accord MacCunn, Political Philosophy of Burke
at 187 (cited in note 2) (calling Burke "[rieverently religious"). The most comprehensive
study of Burke's theology is in Canavan (cited in note 2). It places him in the mainstream
of the Anglican tradition, with influences from high Medieval Catholic thought. Some
scholars, however, suggest that Burke was a hidden skeptic. See, for example, Harvey Mans-
field, Jr., Burke on Christianity, 9 Studies in Burke and His Time 864 (1968).
Burke, Reflections at 80.
Letter frn Edmund Burke to Richard Burke, Jr. and Thomas King (Feb 4, 1773), in 2
The Correspondence of Edmund Burke 419, 421 (Chicago, 1960) ("Corespondence").
19 Id at 50; MacKnight, 1 Life and Times 202-03, 422-23 (cited in note 16).
20 See Canavan, Burke: Presaiption and Providence at 71-74, 79-81 (cited in note 2). There
have been rumors that Burke converted to Catholicism at the time of his marriage, O'Brien,
The Great Melody at 37-38 (cited in note 13), and that he sought last rites as a Catholic
on his deathbed, id at 590. There is no concrete evidence in support of these supposed
conversions (which, if they had occurred, would have been kept closely secret), and in public
life Burke conducted himself as a faithful member of the Church of England.
Burke, Reflections at 79-80.
"2 Letterfi'om Edmund Burke to an Unknown Person (Jan 20, 1791), in 6 Corespondence 214,
215.
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discussion of denominational affiliation-he explained his adher-
ence to the Anglican church in terms utterly devoid of spiritual,
emotional, theological, or intellectual conviction:
I have been baptised and educated in the Church of England;
and have seen no cause to abandon that communion. When I
do, I shall act upon my conviction or my mistake. I think that
Church harmonises with our civil constitution, with the frame
and fashion of our Society, and with the general Temper of
the people. I think it is better calculated, all circumstances con-
siderd [sic], for keeping peace amongst the different sects, and
of affording to them a reasonable protection, than any other
System. Being something in a middle, it is better disposed to
moderate. 3
This suggests a certain skepticism on Burke's part that individual
religious conscience is able to grasp religious truth, which on many
points "Providence" has "left obscure." 4 For the most part, Burke
is content to accept religious doctrine that "seems to me to come
best recommended by authority." 5 Indeed, Burke suggests that in-
terpretation of scripture by the unaided efforts of the individual
believer is likely to lead to "dangerous fanaticism." 6 This did not
mean that Burke was willing to countenance persecution or repres-
sion of individual religious conscience; but, unlike the evangelical
supporters of religious liberty in America, he thought that spiritual
truth and harmony would be more likely achieved through author-
ity and tradition than through individual conscience and scripture.
This emphasizes the essential Englishness of Burke's position: a
constitutional arrangement based on these premises could hardly
flourish in a country, like newly independent America, inhabited
by the spiritual descendants of Luther and Calvin.
Burke was especially concerned to minimize the differences be-
tween Anglicanism and the faith of his fathers (and mother, and
wife, and cousins). "The Catholics of Ireland," he claimed, "have
the whole of our positive religion: our difference is only a negation
23 Id.
24 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 29.
25 Burke, id at 28.
26 Burke, Speech on the Acts of Unifoymity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 3, 19. See also Ravitch
(cited in note 2), at 373.
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of certain tenets of theirs."27 Indeed, in the Reflections, Burke made
the remarkable claim: "So tenacious are we [the English] of the
old ecclesiastical modes and fashions of institution that very little
alteration has been made in them since the fourteenth or fifteenth
century .... "28 Considering the doctrinal and ecciesiological tergi-
versations that the English church had undergone during that pe-
riod, Burke's observation evinces an uncommonly powerful desire
to obliterate the differences between the Catholic and Anglican
communions. This ecumenical spirit, always present in Burke, be-
came even more powerful after the Revolution in France, when
militant atheism became a challenge to all religion. He wrote in
1795 that "[a]ll the principal religions in Europe stand upon one
common bottom. The support that the whole or the favored parts
may have in the secret dispensations of Providence it is impossible
to tell .... ",29
Some hints of Burke's personal theology can be gleaned from
his letters and public statements. These sources convey an impres-
sion that Burke understood religion almost exclusively as a source
of a moral code, of hope and consolation on earth, and of rewards
and punishments in the life to come. In his private notebook,
Burke wrote that "The Principle of Religion is that God attends
to our Actions to reward and punish them."30 Notably lacking in
Burke's extensive speeches and writings about religion is any refer-
ence to the central tenet of mainstream Christianity: the vicarious
atonement of Jesus Christ and redemption through faith in Him.3
27 Edmund Burke, Letter on the Affairs of Ireland (1797), in 6 Works 413, 425 (italics in
original).
20 Burke, Reflections at 87.
29 Letter from Edmund Burke to William Smith, Esq., on the Subject of Catholic Emancipation
(Jan 29, 1795), in 6 Works 361, 368. See also Letter from Edmund Burke to Richard Burke,
Esq. on Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland (1793), in 6 Works 385, 400 ("I do not pretend to
take pride in an extravagant attachment to any sect."). Significantly, Burke participated in
Presbyterian worship services at the time of his investiture as Lord Rector of Glasgow
University-evincing an ecumenism rare for his day. MacKnight, 3 Life and Times at 76
(cited in note 16).
" Edmund Burke, Religion of No Efficacy, Considered as a State Engine, in H. H. F. Somerset,
ed, A Notebook of Edmund Burke 67 (Cambridge, 1957) ("Notebook"). The Notebook was appar-
ently written between 1750 and 1756, but not published. Compare Burke, Reflections at 140
("The body of all true religion consists, to be sure, in obedience to the will of the Sovereign
of the world, in a confidence in his declarations, and in imitation of his perfections. The
rest is our own.").
3' In his Notebook, Burke articulates a theology of works righteousness that is decidedly
unorthodox from a Protestant point of view. "[O]ur Performance of our Duty here," he
writes, "must make our fate afterwards." Somerset, Notebook at 72 (cited in note 30).
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Indeed, Burke never mentions Christ (though he frequently men-
tions God), and he rarely quotes the Bible. 2 On the other hand,
Burke did not move in the direction of rational religion, so attrac-
tive to many of his contemporaries. That would be the religious
equivalent of the metaphysics and abstraction that he so deplored
in politics. He was critical of clergy who, "shamed and frightened
at the Imputation of Enthusiasm, endeavour to cover Religion un-
der the Shield of Reason, which will have some force with their
Adversaries."33 Instead, Burke adhered to fundamentals of the
faith, and was willing to "take that which seems to me to come
best recommended by authority.3'1 4
B. BURKE'S EARLY EXPERIENCE IN IRELAND
Toleration was Burke's central preoccupation in his first public
office. In 1759, he was appointed private secretary to William Ge-
rard Hamilton, who served as Chief Secretary for Ireland from
1761 to 1764. In that capacity (officially powerless but in practice
influential), Burke embarked upon a detailed study of the Penal
Laws-the laws for the suppression of Roman Catholicism in Ire-
land-and began what was to be a lifelong campaign for reform.
Writing in 1795, Burke recalled that he had begun to work against
the Penal Laws in Ireland "four or five and thirty years ago" and
that he had been "ever since, of the same opinion on the justice
and policy of the whole and of every part of the penal system."3
The Irish Penal Laws in Burke's day were harsh and oppressive.
Burke claimed that they were worse than "any scheme of religious
persecution now existing in any other country in Europe, or which
has prevailed in any time or nation with which history has made
31 A rare exception is his quotation of Matthew 18:22-23, in a rebuke to certain Protestant
dissenting clergy who opposed the extension of toleration to a wider category of Dissenters.
Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works 21,
30. In the Reflections he quotes passages from Ecclesiasticus, while carefully and explicitly
maintaining agnosticism about the canonicity of the book. Burke, Reflections at 43 n 10.
3 Burke, Religion of No Efficacy, Considered as a State Engine, in Somerset, Notebook at 67
(cited in note 30).
34 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief ofProtestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 28.
35 Second Letter fiwn Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Catholic Question (May
26, 1795), in 6 Works 375, 383-84.
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us acquainted."36 All monks, friars, and priests not then actually
in parishes were banished from the kingdom under Queen Anne,
on penalty of death if they should return, with rewards for appre-
hending them and penalties for harboring them. "As all the priests
then in being and registered are long since dead," Burke com-
mented, "and as these laws are made perpetual, every Popish priest
is liable to the law."37 In addition, the Catholic people of Ireland
were subjected to severe civil disabilities, among them: denial of
the vote; exclusion from public office, military service, higher edu-
cation, and the practice of law (even as a clerk); denial of the right
to bear arms even in self defense; susceptibility to search without
warrant; denial of the right to buy or lease real property for any
period exceeding thirty-one years; denial of the right to devise
property by will or by primogeniture; insecurity of property (if
children of Catholic property owners converted, they could seize
their parents' property and leave only the life estate); destruction
of parental rights in the event a Catholic's spouse converted; and
prohibition of teaching. Any child who was educated in a Catholic
school in another country was stripped for life of any right to legal
capacity or property ownership, and so were the persons who sent
or maintained them, unless the child abjured the Catholic faith
within six months of return. Enforcement of these restrictions was
by trial before Protestant magistrates and juries, often with the
burden of proof shifted to the Catholic defendant."
By Burke's day, anti-popery laws were little enforced in England
and Scotland. Blackstone, an apologist for the Penal Laws, ob-
served that they "are seldom exerted to their utmost rigour: and,
indeed if they were, it would be very difficult to excuse them."39
They inflicted more indignity than actual hardship. But in Ireland,
the Penal Laws were not anachronisms. Although enforced with
less severity than in the previous century, the laws continued to
serve the political and economic interests of the dominant Protes-
36 Edmund Burke, Tract Relative to the Laws against Popesy in Ireland (circa 1761), in 6
Works 299, 318 ("Tract on the Popery Laws").
37 Id at 317.
38 See id at 302-17. The Irish Penal Laws and various Catholic Relief Acts of the period
are reproduced in excerpted form as appendices to Thomas H. D. Mahoney, Edmund Burke
and Ireland 325-42 (Harvard, 1960) ("Burke and Ireland").
39 William Blackstone, IV Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 57 (Callaghan,
3d rev ed 1884).
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tant minority, which had exclusive control of Irish Parliament, ad-
ministration, court, and juries. The Protestant Ascendancy was not
willing to give up its tools of legal domination without a struggle.40
It was during this period that Burke wrote (but never published)
his Tract Relative to the Laws Against Popery in Ireland.41 In the Tract,
he argued that the Penal Laws were both unjust ("these politics
are rotten and hollow at bottom, as all that are founded upon any
however minute a degree of positive injustice must ever be"42) and
ineffective as an instrument for the spread of the Protestant reli-
gion. "Ireland, after almost a century of persecution, is at this hour
full of penalties and full of Papists.... We found the people here-
tics and idolaters; we have, by way of improving their condition,
rendered them slaves and beggars: they remain in all the misfor-
tune of their old errors, and all the superadded misery of their
recent punishment." 43
Burke's sympathy for the oppressed, even then, could not be
divorced from his essentially conservative theory of government,
which in later life would cause Burke to oppose the designs of
revolutionaries and innovators with the same vigor that he opposed
the tyranny in Ireland. All power-whether monarchical or demo-
cratic-must be restrained by the enduring truths of what Burke
called "original justice," 44 which reveals itself only slowly, with ex-
perience, over time. Accordingly, the persecution of Catholics in
Ireland held for Burke a peculiar horror. Whether erroneous or
not, Catholicism in Ireland drew its strength from long-standing
practice and belief-precisely the same prop that supports and
constrains legitimate government. Thus, he warned the English
that "you punish them [the Catholics of Ireland] for acting upon
a principle which of all others is perhaps the most necessary for
preserving society, an implicit admiration and adherence to the
establishments of their forefathers." 45
40 See First Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works
241, 252-53. This was even more true in the 1760s, when Burke first addressed the issue.
41 Published in 6 Works 299. Unfortunately, all that survives is a substantial fragment,
some of which is taken from a rough draft.
42Id at 337.
43Id at 334, 341.
44Id at 323.
4SId at 337.
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Those scholars who purport to see a fundamental shift in
Burke's principles-from a liberal, tolerant, whiggish beginning to
a conservative, establishmentarian, tory conclusion 41-have given
insufficient attention to this early Tract, in which he grounded his
argument for liberal reform in the same principles that later would
inspire his essays decrying the Revolution in France. "It would be
hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all the order
and beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society,"
Burke wrote in the Tract, "than the position, that any body of men
have a right to make what laws they please. ' 47 Later, he would
deploy the same argument in his attack on the French Revolution:
"Neither the few nor the many have a right to act merely by their
will. '48 In Ireland as in France, Burke invoked age-old experience
both for the preservation of society and as the means of resistance
to arbitrary government.
Despite his work on the Penal Laws and the general liberality
of Hamilton's administration in Ireland, little progress toward tol-
eration was made during Burke's tenure in office. The Penal Laws
themselves were untouched. Much of Burke's attention was de-
voted to a defensive reaction to what were called the "Whiteboy"
disturbances (after the participants' practice of wearing white shirts
over their clothes, to distinguish one another at night). These up-
risings, which Burke attributed to economic deprivations, were
blamed by Protestant landlords on Jacobite and French sedition
and used as an excuse to crack down on Irish Catholic dissent. A
number of suspected Whiteboys were hanged by local authorities.
When the administration refused to treat the Whiteboy distur-
bances as sectarian or political in nature, Protestant gentry were
angered, and the cause of systemic reform rendered impossible.49
Burke made one other modest attempt toward toleration. In the
first public position of his career, he won support from the Privy
'See Clark, English Society at 250 (cited in note 2). This charge of inconsistency had
frequently been leveled against Burke by his critics, including Thomas Paine, Mary Woll-
stonecraft, and (later) Charles James Fox, and was answered by him in An Appeal from the
New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57, 92 et seq.
47 Burke, Tract on the Popeiy Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 322. Compare Burke,
Reflections at 82-86; Burke, An Appeal fiom the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57,
120-21.
4 Burke, An Appeal fl-om the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57, 162.
41 See O'Brien, The Great Melody at 44-46 (cited in note 13). Burke later described these
events in his First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241, 254-55.
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Council to allow six regiments of Catholic Irish to be formed to
defend England's ally, Portugal, at Portuguese expense. It was
thought that this would help to dispel the persistent suspicion that
the Catholic majority were disloyal to Britain, and serve as a bridge
toward enlargement of civil capacities. But even this small step was
defeated in the Irish Parliament, because of fears that arming the
Catholics could prove dangerous."0
Nothing more was to be accomplished. Hamilton was dismissed
from his Irish post in 1764. With him, Burke returned to England.
The following year the two men had a falling out, caused-at least
in part-by differences over the Catholic question (as well as over
money). Burke thought Hamilton insufficiently energetic in his ef-
forts on behalf of Catholic emancipation. Hamilton, for his part,
called Burke "a Jew and a Jesuit.""
C. BURKE'S EARLY PARLIAMENTARY CAREER
Burke soon acquired a more lasting and satisfactory patron,
through whom he entered Parliament and rose to become one of
its most influential figures. In July of 1765, he became private sec-
retary to the Second Marquess of Rockingham, the leader of the
most prominent faction of the Whig Party, who was then forming
a government. s2 Later that year, Burke was elected to Parliament
from Wendover, a pocket borough belonging to a Rockingham
ally. Unfortunately for Burke, the Rockingham government fell
the next year, its one significant achievement being repeal of the
Stamp Act. For the next sixteen years Burke was but a member of
the opposition. His talents, however, were such that, despite his
inauspicious background as an Irishman and suspected Catholic,
Burke became a formidable power in English politics, generally
regarded as the intellectual leader and spokesman of the Rocking-
ham Whigs.
Early in his career, Burke was forced to confront one of the
"
5For an account of this episode, see Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 14-15 (cited in note
38).
s, O'Brien, The Great Melody at 47-48 (cited in note 13).
52 Burke's appointment was almost forestalled by the circulation of rumors that he was
a Catholic and ajesuit. Rockingham approached Burke to ask about the rumors, and Burke's
response must have been satisfactory. Id at 48-49; Carl B. Cone, Burke and the Nature of
Politics: The Age of the American Revolution 71-72 (Kentucky, 1957).
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most vexing and persistent issues of eighteenth-century politics:
the rights of Protestant Dissenters. In theory, "penal laws" pun-
ished the open practice (though never mere belief) of religion out-
side the Church of England, "disability laws" (notably the Test
Act and the Corporation Act) excluded Dissenters from public (and
some forms of private) office, and the "Act of Uniformity" pre-
scribed Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith to which all clergy were re-
quired to subscribe. 3 Since the Glorious Revolution in 1688, how-
ever, Protestant Dissenters had enjoyed a significant degree of
toleration. Under the Act of Toleration, enacted in the first year
of the reign of William and Mary, the penalties of certain of the
penal acts would not apply to Protestant Dissenters, and Protestant
dissenting clergy were permitted to conduct religious worship ser-
vices provided they adhered to 36 and part of one other of the
Thirty-Nine Articles (omitting those that related to church gover-
nance and infant baptism).
The Act of Toleration was celebrated as a cornerstone of Protes-
tant liberty, but we should not forget its limitations. As a formal
matter, it lifted penalties only, leaving the legal requirements of
conformity theoretically in place, and it extended only to trinitar-
ian Protestants (primarily Presbyterians, Independents, and Bap-
tists), thus excluding not only Catholics, Jews, and other non-
Christians, but also the increasingly visible "Rational Dissenters":
deists, Socinians, Arians, and Unitarians of various sorts who criti-
cized orthodox Christianity as irrational, unscientific, and oppres-
sive.14 Moreover, the Act of Toleration did not affect the Test and
Corporation Acts, which limited public and corporate office to
those who participated in the Anglican sacrament. Repeated efforts
were made between 1727 and 1739 to repeal the Test and Corpo-
ration Acts, but these were unsuccessful-though annual Indem-
nity Acts were passed after 1727 to suspend the penalty of the
Test Laws, and the practice of "occasional conformity" enabled
Dissenters to evade the laws by occasional, insincere participation
53 See Blackstone, 4 Blackstone's Commentaries at 53-58 (cited in note 39). These restric-
tions help to explain the structure of the provisions of the United States Constitution re-
lating to religion. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits enactment of laws similar to the
Penal Laws; the Test Oath Clause of Article VI prohibits disability laws; and the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits laws similar to the Act of Uniformity.
14 See generally Michael R. Watts, The Dissenters: From the Refornation to the French Revo-
lution 371-82, 464-78 (Clarendon, 1978).
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in the Anglican sacrament. As a result of these measures (as well
as informal nonenforcement), the penal and disability laws had far
less practical consequence than their formal provisions would sug-
gest. Burke called the Test Act "hardly anything more than a dead
letter."5s5 Dissenters were elected to municipal corporate office and
even to Parliament, and it was not unusual for clergy within the
Anglican Church to question some of the doctrinal tenets of the
Thirty-Nine Articles. Nontrinitarian churches were generally able
to conduct services without legal molestation.56
The Dissenters pursued a two-course strategy of urging greater
"comprehension" within the established church (meaning relax-
ation and liberalization of the liturgical and doctrinal requirements
specified by the Act of Uniformity) and greater toleration of Dis-
senters outside the church. In these efforts, they generally received
the warm support of the Whigs and the opposition of the High
Church and Tory parties. Burke, however, treated these two pro-
posed lines of reform as different in principle. In his treatment of
two proposals in 1772 and 1773 we can see the foundation of his
understanding of the relation between establishment and tolera-
don.
In 1772, some 250 Anglican clergymen signed a petition (called
the "Feathers Tavern" petition) asking Parliament to abolish the
requirement of subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith
of the Church of England, and replace it with a simple affirmation
of the Bible as the source of divine truth.5 ' The petition was sup-
ported by most of Burke's friends and allies in the Whig Party,"
who saw it as a step toward a more tolerant and rational church.
To their surprise, Burke spoke against the petition. He began by
distancing himself from the High Church position, and from what
5 First Letter frn Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
264.
s6 See generally Henriques, Religious Toleration at 5-17 (cited in note 2); Clark, English
Society at 316 (cited in note 2).
" The petition also sought similar relief on behalf of students of civil law and medicine
at Oxford and Cambridge, who had to subscribe to the Articles in order to receive their
degrees. Both sides in the parliamentary debate agreed on the justice of this aspect of the
measure. When it came up for separate consideration the next year, however, Burke was
out of the country, and the measure was defeated. Cone, Burke and the Nature of Politics
at 219 n 22 (cited in note 52).
5
'See Letter fi-n Edmund Burke to the Countess of Huntingdon (ante Feb 6, 1772), in 2
Correspondence 298, 299.
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he considered to be erroneous grounds for opposition to the peti-
tion. He explained that "[i]f ever there was anything to which,
from reason, nature, habit, and principle, I am totally averse, it is
persecution for conscientious difference of opinion."59 But, he said,
the petition "does not concern toleration, but establishment"-
the right of the people of England to maintain a church in accor-
dance with their own theological principles." Those who "do not
like the Establishment ... have free liberty to assemble a congre-
gation of their own."61 It is an essential right of any church, how-
ever, to determine its doctrines and require conformity from its
clergy; in this respect the Church of England enjoys the rights of
any church or voluntary society. "If you will have religion publicly
practised and publicly taught," he noted, "you must have a power
to say what that religion will be which you will protect and encour-
age."62 If you allow the clergy "the power of taxing the people of
England for the maintenance of their private opinions," he said,
"you take away the liberty of the elector, which is the people, that
is, the state."63 The complaint, therefore, he said derisively, "is not
toleration of diversity in opinion, but that diversity in opinion is
not rewarded by bishoprics, rectories, and collegiate stalls. 6 4 The
bill was defeated, and subsequently a significant body of Anglican
clergy resigned their livings and joined the ranks of the Rational
Dissenters.
The following year, a group of dissenting clergy sought repeal
of the requirement that they adhere to any part of the Thirty-
Nine Articles. This requirement was not generally enforced, and
some members argued that it was therefore no serious grievance,
but should be maintained as an essentially symbolic reminder of
the exclusive character of the establishment. The repeal legislation
easily passed the House of Commons, but, with royal intervention,
was defeated in the House of Lords.
" Burke, Speech on the Acts of Unifomnity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 3, 10.
60 Id at 15.
61 Id at 12. In this, Burke was expressing his opinion, rather than accurately stating the
law. Technically, all clergy were required to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles (or at
least to the subset specified in the Act of Toleration). Burke supported efforts to repeal
this limitation.
6 1 Id at 16.
63 Id at 12, 16.
14 Id at 15.
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On this occasion, Burke supported the Dissenters, making what
might seem to be the obvious distinction between the right to
preach and the right to preach as a clergyman of the Church of
England. At the time, most observers regarded this as a reversal
of position, because for most the battle lines were drawn between
supporters of the establishment and advocates of theological
change. For Burke the two positions were entirely consistent.
Burke addressed his remarks to an "honorable gentleman" who
had argued that "establishing toleration by law is an attack on
Christianity."65 Burke, by contrast, was "persuaded that toleration,
so far from being an attack upon Christianity, becomes the best
and surest support that possibly can be given it."66 "I may be mis-
taken, but I take toleration to be a part of religion."67 Burke did
not base his argument so much on the importance of individual
conscience, but on the value of religion-even of dissenting reli-
gion. "Do not promote diversity," he said, but "when you have
it, bear it; have as many sorts of religion as you find in your coun-
try; there is a reasonable worship in them all."68 The real struggle,
he argued, is not among the various religions, but between religion
and atheism.
One thing had changed between the two petitions: Burke had
gone to France and spent a month in the salons of Paris, where
he became acquainted with the disturbingly atheistic ideas of the
philosophes. In all likelihood, this is the background for Burke's sur-
prisingly harsh denunciations of atheists as "outlaws of the consti-
tution" and a "confederacy of the powers of darkness," who are
"endeavoring to shake all the works of God established in order
and beauty."69 This may seem overwrought; Burke himself said
"[p]erhaps I am carried too far."7 But his experience in France
solidified Burke's determination to create, through toleration, what
he called "an alliance offensive and defensive"'" of all religions
against the threat of unbelief and its political manifestations.
65 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 24.
6Id at 25.
67 Id at 33.
6id at 36.
69Id at 36, 37.
"°Id at 37.
71 Id.
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The theory that Burke's early career was tolerant and liberal,
and his later career conservative and establishmentarian,72 or that
his attitude toward radical Dissent soured when the Dissenters de-
serted Burke's Whig faction in favor of Pitt in the elections of
1784,'7 are difficult to sustain in light of these speeches in 1772
and 1773. At this point, Burke was at the center of Whig politics
and a friend to Fox; his political relations with Dissenters were
warm;74 and the French Revolution was more than fifteen years in
the future. This was Burke's most "liberal" period-if Burke's ca-
reer can be divided between "liberal" and "conservative" periods.
Yet even at this time, we see Burke as a staunch defender of the
establishment, as a believer in ecclesiastical authority rather than
individualistic conscience, and as an opponent of atheism. As his
worst fears about the consequences of a politicized atheism came
true in France in later years, the emotional temperature of Burke's
"conservative" side undoubtedly increased, but the substance of
his later arguments in the Reflections was plainly adumbrated in his
treatment of the petitions of the Protestant Dissenters in 1772 and
1773.
D. CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION, THE GORDON RIOTS, AND DEFEAT
IN BRISTOL
Burke's rising stature as a politician enabled him to run success-
fully for Parliament from the second city of the realm, the port
of Bristol. In that capacity, Burke returned to his lifelong project
of mitigating the anti-popery laws. In 1778, Burke induced Sir
George Savile, a Protestant of aristocratic family with large land
holdings in Ireland, to introduce legislation repealing the Penal
Act of 1699, an act of "ludicrous cruelty" (according to Burke),7"
which outlawed performance of the Catholic mass and Catholic
education, and which deprived Catholics of the right to bequeath
property. Lord John Cavendish introduced a second bill authoriz-
ing the Irish Parliament to pass similar relief for the Catholics of
that land. Although Burke was undoubtedly the prime mover of
" See note 16 and accompanying text.
'3 See Henriques, Religious Toleration at 117 (cited in note 2).
Leading Dissenters praised Burke in 1772 for "magnificent efforts" in their behalf.
Cone, Burke and the Nature of Politics at 224 (cited in note 52).
" Burke, Speech at Bristol, Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 Works 365, 409.
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these measures behind the scenes, he neither made the motions
nor spoke in favor of the bills on the floor of the House, largely
because of widespread insinuations that he was too close to the
Catholic cause. The bills were enacted, and the Irish Parliament
followed suit with a somewhat more limited bill of relief, which
Burke later described as a "first faint sketch of toleration, which
did little more than disclose a principle and mark out a disposi-
tion. '76
Burke was widely given the credit in Ireland for passage of these
measures, and it is reported that the King was influenced to sign
by an "Address and Petition to the Throne" Burke had drafted
some fourteen years before, which was preserved and presented to
the monarch." Burke himself attributed the change in opinion that
enabled passage of the bills to the crisis precipitated by the Ameri-
can Revolution, which made it imperative that all the subjects of
Britain be conciliated and united.78
The next step was introduction of a similar measure for Catholic
emancipation in Scotland. This, however, was blocked by the fierce
opposition of an organization called the Protestant Association, led
by the fanatical Lord George Gordon. Gordon, a strange figure
who later converted to Judaism and eventually died insane, led a
mob of some 60,000 people to Parliament to present a petition
demanding repeal of the English Relief Act. The mob, which one
historian has called "unparalleled in the history of parliament,"
forced entering members of the Lords and Commons to wear blue
cockades and shout "No Popery!," violently attacking those who
resisted (including such luminaries as the Archbishop of York, the
Bishop of Lincoln, the Duke of Northumberland, and Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield).79 There ensued a week of riots during which
Catholic churches were looted and burned, homes and other prop-
erty destroyed, many members of Parliament roughed up, and
Burke's home, family, and person threatened. As many as 450 lives
may have been lost.8° Burke later described the scene at Parliament
76 Id at 403-04.
77 See Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 69-74 (cited in note 38); MacKnight, 2 Life and
Times at 236-46 (cited in note 16).
Burke, Speech at Bristol Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 Works 365, 400-04.
79Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 93-94 (cited in note 38).
"See Stanley Ayling, Edmund Burke: His Life and Opinions 97 (St. Martin's, 1988). See
also Cone, Burke and the Nature of Politics at 350-52 (cited in note 52).
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to his Bristol constituents, stating: "I do not wish to go over the
horrid scene that was afterwards acted. Would to God it could be
expunged forever from the annals of this country!"8'
Despite urgings by his friends to leave the city, Burke repeatedly
ventured among the mob, announcing his identity and his support
for the Relief Act. 2 Inside Parliament, he unstintingly opposed re-
peal of the Act. As he described it:
In this audacious tumult, ... I, who had exerted myself very
little on the quiet passing of the bill, thought it necessary then
to come forward. I was not alone; but... I may and will value
myself so far, that, yielding in abilities to many, I yielded in
zeal to none. With warmth and with vigor, and animated with
a just and natural indignation, I called forth every faculty that
I possessed, and I directed it in every way in which I could
possibly employ it. I labored night and day. I labored in Parlia-
ment; I labored out of Parliament. If, therefore, the resolution
of the House of Commons, refusing to commit this act of un-
matched turpitude, be a crime, I am guilty among the fore-
most.
83
Burke prevailed and the Act survived, but the King and the gov-
ernment privately made clear that they would not support any fur-
ther reform of the Penal Laws, for fear of future violence.84 Indeed,
the House of Commons passed (though the Lords rejected) a bill
offered by Sir George Savile as a sop to the Protestant Association,
which would restrain the "Papists, or persons professing the Pop-
ish religion, from teaching, or taking upon themselves the educa-
tion or government of the children of Protestants."" s Burke took
a spirited part in debate against the bill, defending Catholic educa-
tion and the rights of parents to direct the education of their off-
spring. This foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court's (1925) hold-
ing in Pierce v Society of Sisters.86
Burke found himself in political trouble with his Bristol constit-
uents, who were not pleased with his activities in favor of Irish
81 Burke, Speech at Bristol, Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 Works 365, 410.
82 Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 95 (cited in note 38); MacKnight, 2 Life and Times at
366 (cited in note 16); Cone, Burke and the Nature of Politics at 351 (cited in note 52).
83 Burke, Speech at Bristol, Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 Woorks 365, 412-13.
"
4Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 96 (cited in note 38).
85 Id at 98-99.
- 268 US 510 (1925).
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trade, in opposition to life imprisonment for debt, or in support
of the American colonists-and most of all, who were distressed
by his role in passage of the Catholic Relief Act. Burke delivered
an impassioned speech defending his role in the Act, and the pro-
priety of religious toleration. Despite his constituents' disapproval,
he declared that he "never was less sorry for any action of my
life.""7 "I could do nothing but what I have done on this subject,"
he told them, "without confounding the whole train of my ideas
and disturbing the whole order of my life."8 He explained that
this was an issue on which he was compelled to follow his con-
science rather than the wishes of his constituents. "No man carries
further than I do the policy of making government pleasing to the
people," he said, "[b]ut the widest range of this politic complai-
sance is confined within the limits of justice .... I never will act
the tyrant for their amusement."89
Burke paid the price of electoral rejection. Thenceforth he
served in Parliament in the less exalted role of member for a
pocket borough.
E. BURKE'S LATER CAREER, THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,
AND DISASTER IN IRELAND
The next decade was for Burke a time of frenetic activity, great
achievement, and political disappointment. The Rockingham
Whigs came to power (briefly) with the collapse of the war effort
against the Americans in 1782. Though formally only a junior
minister, Burke played a significant role in forcing peace on a re-
luctant George I1, and won passage of his "economical reform."
After only a few months, however, Rockingham died and Burke
went into opposition, returning to power (again briefly) the follow-
ing year. During this period, Burke began his crusade against cor-
ruption and colonial exploitation in India-an effort that brought
about the defeat of his political party. The India effort occupied
Burke's attention (in the form of prosecuting the impeachment of
Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal) for more than
half a decade: a tiring, thankless, and ultimately fruitless task.
" Burke, Speech at Bristol Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 Works 365, 419.
Id at 388.
9d at 421.
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All the while, Burke pursued his efforts for the toleration of
Catholics in Ireland. One of the more dubious achievements of
the Rockingham Administration was passage of legislation restor-
ing power to the Irish Parliament.9 The principal arena for reform
of the Irish Penal Laws thus shifted to Ireland. In some ways, this
made reform more difficult, because Catholics were excluded from
Parliament as both electors and members.
Burke corresponded actively with members of the Irish Parlia-
ment as well as leaders in the movement for reform. Many of these
letters were published and served as public advocacy. Among these,
Burke's Letter to a Peer of Ireland (Lord Kenmare, then head of
the Catholic Association) in 1782,91 and First Letter to Sir Hercules
Langrishe (a member of the Irish Parliament and moderate advo-
cate of reform) in 1792,92 are classics, and contributed significantly
to the passage of reform legislation in those years. The 1782 Act
removed restrictions on purchasing, inheriting, and bequeathing
land and legitimated most of the priestly functions of parish
priests. The 1792 Act opened the practice of law to Catholics,
lifted the ban on religious intermarriage, permitted Catholic
schools, and allowed foreign education of Catholic children.
In 1790, in recognition of Burke's guiding role, the Catholic
Committee of Ireland hired his son, Richard, as its agent for the
campaign for enfranchisement and other reform. As the chairman
of the Committee observed, "The many obligations we are under
to the Zeal and brilliant Abilities of the Father inspire us with the
strongest reliance on the Son for his most strenuous exertions and
able assistance in our behalf."93 Burke wrote an interesting series
of letters to his son in that capacity, discussing the circumstances
in Ireland and the reasons for further reform. These offer insight
both into the complicated political dynamics of the Irish question,
and also into Burke's own principles of political prudence and re-
form. The overriding problem in Ireland, as perceived by Burke,
was that the intransigence of the Protestant authorities was driving
9 Burke opposed this measure, at least when it was first proposed, apparently because it
would strengthen the hand of the Protestant Ascendancy. Later, after Irish leaders promised
support for Catholic emancipation, Burke muted and perhaps abandoned his opposition.
O'Brien, The Great Melody at 197-201, 243-45 (cited in note 13).
9' Published in 4 Works 217.
9 Published in 4 Works 241.
9' Quoted in Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 162 (cited in note 38).
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the Catholics to violence, as well as to an association with the revo-
lutionary principles emanating from France. He attempted a com-
promise based on preservation of the existing civil structure of the
Irish nation, accompanied by Catholic emancipation and enfran-
chisement. Fearing the effects of violence, Burke urged on the
Irish people a strategy of "still, discontented, passive obedience"
in lieu of a "giddy unsupported resistance. '94
Largely as a result of the efforts of Burke and his son, the British
government pressured the Irish Parliament to enact a third Catho-
lic Relief Act in 1793, extending to qualified Catholic citizens the
rights to vote, to serve on juries, to hold military commissions,
and to obtain university degrees, provided they took an oath that,
among other things, denied the infallibility of the Pope and ab-
jured any intention to disturb the established church.95 Catholics
remained excluded from Parliament and other high offices of Irish
government, and the hostility between the Protestant government
and the Catholic majority continued to fester.
During the same period, Protestant Dissent reemerged as an is-
sue in Parliament, through a series of petitions for repeal of the
Corporation and Test Acts. For Burke, this was not precisely an
issue of toleration. Even as regards the Catholics of Ireland, Burke
accepted the well-established distinction between the right to prac-
tice one's religion and even to vote, and the right to hold high
political office.96 Restrictions on officeholding had long been a
constitutional device by which Parliament could restrict the power
of untrustworthy monarchs to appoint officials who were not com-
mitted to the principles of the Protestant settlement of 1688. On
the other hand, the form of the Test Act was particularly obnox-
ious: to require officeholders to take Anglican communion was, as
Burke said, "a bad and insufficient test for the end it was meant
to accomplish." 97 He called it "an abuse of the sacramental rite." 98
Burke found it difficult to make up his mind. As of 1780, he
94Quoted in id at 202.
95Id at 211-16.
96See Burke, Tract on the Popery Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 311; First Letter from
Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241, 252-53.
9 Edmund Burke, Speech on Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (Mar 2, 1790), in 28
Parliamentary History of England 432, 441 (T. C. Hansard, 1816) ("Parliamentary History").
93Id.
416 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
was prepared to support repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts."
But he perceived that the character of Dissent was changing.
Rather than representing a difference of conscience, Burke be-
lieved that the organized forces of Dissent had been transformed
into a "political faction," for the specific purpose of subverting the
constitution of church and state, and destroying the Church of
England,.'0°
Moreover, Burke's views on the church-state issue were pro-
foundly influenced by the events then unfolding in France. Among
the first actions of the new revolutionary authorities were the dis-
establishment of the church, the seizure of its property, and harass-
ment of its faithful clergy. It was not long before the church was
actively persecuted and a "Temple of Reason" erected on the altar
of Notre Dame. Even before the Terror, at a time when liberal
politicians and preachers in England still hailed the revolution as
a triumph of liberty, Burke responded with his most famous work,
Reflections on the Revolution in France, denouncing the Revolution
and warning of parallel movements in England. Burke, together
with Hume, was the first to perceive that principles of Enlighten-
ment, democratization, modernization, defeudalization, and hu-
man rights could, if unconstrained, produce a regime of tyranny
and religious persecution. The Reflections contained his great de-
fense of the established institutions of the English constitution:
"We are resolved," he declared, "to keep an established church,
an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an estab-
lished democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no greater. ' ' l°
Burke's counter-revolutionary fervor precipitated a painful break
in 1791 with his friend and protege and the leader of his political
party, Charles James Fox, who continued to support the Revolu-
tion. After this, Burke (ironically, the great defender of party loy-
alty) was a man without a party.
As the French Revolution came to dominate Burke's attention,
he became less accommodating toward those radical Protestants
who, he believed, were the vanguard of Jacobinism in the British
" He so stated publicly a decade later. Id at 442. See also Letterfi-om Edmund Burke to
Edmund S. Pey (July 18, 1778), in 6 Works 197, 202.
" Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitaians (May 11, 1792), 7 Works 39, 47 (emphasis
in original).
101 Burke, Reflections at 80.
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Isles. He had learned from the French experience that "rationalist"
critics of the church were capable of acts of antireligious fanati-
cism, and he was shocked when ostensibly liberal English Dissent-
ers were enthusiastic-rather than horrified-about the events in
France. Accordingly, he absented himself from the House when
proposals for repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts came to the
floor in 1787 and 1789,102 and he moved into active opposition in
debates in 1790 and 1792.103 He explained in a letter to Richard
Bright, a prominent Dissenter and a neighbor at Beaconsfield, that
he had previously been willing to overlook "many things which
appeard to me, perhaps not so commendable in the Conduct of
those who seemd to lead [the Dissenters]" because he had thought
them "animated with a serious, humane, hatred of Tyranny, op-
pression, and corruption in all persons in power." 1' But he had
"found by experience" that they were "of a direct contrary Charac-
ter"-that they were attempting to draw England into an imitation
of the French Revolution, which would be "highly dangerous to
the constitution and the prosperity of this Country."105
It is common for modern scholars to dismiss Burke's position
on the Test and Corporation Acts as an abandonment of "the prin-
ciple of religious toleration,""1 6 but Burke understood the question
of eligibility for political office as raising issues of politics and
power rather than conscience. Thus, while he "professed himself
10 In a letter, Burke wrote that if he were able to attend the vote on the bill in 1789,
he would "certainly" vote for it, "in conformity to my known principles." Letterfrom Ed-
mund Burke to Richard Bright (May 8-9, 1789), in 5 Correspondence 470. But in view of
Burke's exhausting labors on the Hastings impeachment, his ill health, and the Dissenters'
betrayal of the Whigs in the election of 1784, Burke stated that he would not engage in
"Activity" in support of the bill, and that he would, in all likelihood, not attend the Parlia-
mentary session. Id.
103 See Burke, Speech on Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (Mar 2, 1790), in 28 Parlia-
mentary Histoyy 432, 440-41. See also Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May
11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 49-50.
"I' Letterfroin Edmund Burke to Richard Bright (Feb 18, 1790), in 6 Correspondence 82, 83.
105 Id.
"6 See L. G. Mitchell, Introduction, to 8 Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 8
(Clarendon, 1989). Mitchell's further statement that, for Burke, "[rieligious dissent of all
kinds acquired a demonic character," id, suggests a misunderstanding of Burke. If anything,
the French Revolution solidified Burke's disposition toward toleration of what he called all
"serious religion." See Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17,
1773), in 7 Works 21, 37. See also discussion in text at notes 65-74. Burke's fear and distaste
was reserved for atheists and those radical Dissenters whose emphasis was on attacking
revealed and established religion rather than on any affirmative teaching of their own.
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ready to grant relief from oppression to all men," he was "unwill-
ing to grant power, because power once possessed was generally
abused."' 7 His argument was straightforward: the established
Church of England is an essential element of the constitution ("a
great national benefit, a great public blessing"' 8); prominent Dis-
senters have declared their intention to destroy and persecute the
church; it is only their lack of access to political power that pre-
vents them from achieving their announced objectives; the Test
and Corporation Acts are thus necessary to protect the constitu-
tion, the establishment, and the Church. The "question," there-
fore "is, whether you should keep them within the bounds of toler-
ation, or subject yourself to their persecution. '"109 It is easy to say,
in retrospect, that Burke's fears on this subject were exaggerated,
but this was the world's first confrontation with revolutionary in-
ternationalism, and the rest of Europe was being swept into its
vortex. Even so, Burke did not propose to add any new limitations
or penalties on those he deemed so dangerous: he urged only that
the occasion was not ripe for the lifting of political incapacities
that already existed.
The form of the Test Act, however, remained problematic.
Burke proposed replacement of the sacramental test with a formal
promise not to "attempt to subvert the constitution of the church
of England, as the same is now by law established." 110 Nothing
came of this compromise suggestion.
In his continued efforts on behalf of Catholic emancipation,
Burke the reformer became increasingly indistinguishable from
Burke the conservative. While the intransigence of the Protestant
authorities was driving many Irish Catholics into the arms of Jaco-
binism and rebellion, Burke maintained that the best and most ef-
fective arguments on their behalf came not from the new doctrines
of the Rights of Man but from ancient principles of the English
constitutional system. In his First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrisbe,
he explained why toleration for Catholics was consistent with the
107 Burke, Speech on Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (Mar 2, 1790), in 28 Parliamen-
tary History 432, 441.
Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 56.
0 Id at 48.
Burke, Speech on Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (Mar 2, 1790), in 28 Parliamen-
tary History 432, 441 n *.
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fundamental laws, going back to Magna Charta. m' In an "essay"
written for Henry Dundas, the Home Secretary, Burke argued that
the denial of the franchise to Irish Catholics was a comparatively
recent and deplorable innovation. The extension of a new right is
"very dangerous," Burke wrote, since it could lead to unforeseen
consequences; but restoration of the capacity to enjoy an old right
is "extremely safe." He was careful to dissociate his appeal for en-
franchisement of the Catholics of Ireland from any claim based on
"speculative right" or "general principles of liberty, or as a conclu-
sion from any given premise, either of natural or even of constitu-
tional right." The French Declaration of the Rights of Man had
exposed the dangers of arguments of that sort. Rather, the Catholic
majority should be given the vote as "a protection, and a requisite
security" which they lacked for the exercise of legal right.I" This,
Burke maintained, would strengthen the state, because "a greater
number of persons will be interested in conservation" of the con-
stitution. "[[If the experience of mankind is to be credited, a sea-
sonable extension of rights is the best expedient for the conserva-
tion of them. Every right, every privilege, every immunity, every
distinction known in the world, and which has been preserved
throughout the fluctuations of time and circumstance, has been so
preserved."'' 3 The key words here -"conservation" and "preser-
vaton"-demonstrate the conservative character of Burke's argu-
ment, in which he sought to conserve and protect the ancient lib-
erties of Irishmen and Englishmen against the "fluctuations of
time and circumstance."
Despite the hostile reaction of his former political allies to the
Reflections and the cool reception of his ideas by Pitt, Burke contin-
ued to write furious polemics against the Revolution in France.
He gained credibility and political support as the terrible events
bore out his predictions. He sought to discredit Fox as leader of
the WigsI' 4 and to persuade Pitt to commit to war against revolu-
"I First Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
257-70.
"' Letter from Edmund Burke to Henry Dundas, quoted in Mahoney, Burke and Ireland 207-
09 (cited in note 38).
,,3 Id at 208.
"4 This was the main purpose of Burke's Observations on the Conduct of the Minority (1793),
in 5 Works 1.
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tionary France. 1 5 He warned that ideological movements in Brit-
ain, especially among Rational Dissenters, were parallel to those
that had brought about the Revolution in France, and that from
"the same beginnings" might come "the very same effects." ' 6
Without the support of a political party, Burke became a party unto
himself: a mighty, even obsessive force for counter-revolution. As
Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote in 1793: "Burke is in himself a sort of power
in the State. It is even not too much to say that he is a sort of power
in Europe, though totally without any of those means, or the smallest
share in them, which give or maintain power in other men.""' 7
These efforts eventually bore fruit. In 1793, England entered the
war against France. In 1794, the Whig Party split. The larger faction,
led by the Duke of Pordand, who was friendly to Burke, joined
with Pitt (and against Fox) in a coalition to prosecute war against
France. This coalition marks the beginning of the modern Conserva-
tive Party.
In that same summer, Burke retired from Parliament. But not
from public life. With his caustic Letters on a Regicide Peace,"' he
inveighed against proposals for a premature end to the war. On a
happier note, with the entry of the Portland Whigs into govern-
ment, hopes were raised for a complete Catholic emancipation in
Ireland. Burke's friend and political patron, Rockingham's nephew
Earl Fitzwilliam, was named Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He im-
mediately set about a thorough program of reform, in active con-
sultation with Burke. Comprehensive reform legislation was intro-
duced in the Irish Parliament, and a half million signatures were
reportedly gathered in support. Within a few months of Fitzwil-
liam's arrival, however, the King announced his strong opposition
to the emancipation plans, and the government instructed Fitzwil-
liam to use his "Zeal & Influence" to prevent any further proceed-
ing on the emancipation bill."9 Within a few weeks, Fitzwilliam
' See Edmund Burke, Thoughts on French Affairs (Dec, 1791), in 4 Works 313.
..6 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 50. See
also Burke, Speech on Repeal of the Test and Coporation Acts (Mar 2, 1790), in 28 Parliamentary
History 432, 440-41.
n7 Letter from Sir Gilbert Elliot to Lady Elliot (May 2, 1793), in 2 Life and Letters of the
First Earl of Minto 137-38 (Countess of Minto ed, 1874), quoted in L. G. Mitchell, Introdnc-
tion, in 8 Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 44.
"' Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796-97), in 5 Works 231; Burke, Fourth Letter on
the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directoiy of France (1795-97), in 6 Works 1.
"' See Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 250 (cited in note 38).
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had been dismissed. According to Burke's Irish sources, the coun-
try was "now on the brink of a civil war."' 2 Burke himself wrote
to Fitzwilliam that "My heart is almost broken."''
No more was accomplished toward toleration in Burke's life-
time, and Ireland descended into an era of violence. Burke died
in 1797, at a time when the armies of France were overrunning
Europe. He was buried with the rites of the Anglican Church.
II. BuRxE's DEFENSE OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH
On what grounds did Burke defend the established church,
and how was this connected to his advocacy of toleration? No-
where does Burke set forth the argument in theoretical terms; it
must be pieced together from speeches and essays addressing the
particular political issues of the day.
The established church "is the first of our prejudices," he says
in the Reflections, but he quickly adds that it is "not a prejudice
destitute of reason, but involving in it profound and extensive wis-
dom."'2 As we shall see, Burke's establishment is different, both in
purpose and in character, from the prototypical established church.
A. THE ROLE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT IN BURKE'S CONSTITUTION
Burke did not rest his defense of the established Church of En-
gland on any claim of its spiritual or theological superiority. "It
is not morally true," he said, "that we are bound to establish in
every country that form of religion which in our minds is most
agreeable to truth, and conduces most to the eternal happiness of
mankind."'23 Indeed, it may be said that his defense of the estab-
lished church rested on no theological claim whatsoever. Rather, the
argument was political and constitutional. This is evident, in part,
from the fact that the argument appears in its fullest form in his
Reflections on the Revolution in France, where the established church
120 Letter from Reverend Thomas Hussey to Edmund Burke (Feb 26, 1787), in 8 Correspondence
162, 162.
,2 Letter fi-o Edmund Burke to Earl Fitzviiam (circa Feb 26, 1795), in 8 Correspondence
161, 162.
12 Burke, Reflections at 80.
"' Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 42 (empha-
sis in original).
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is presented as a means of upholding constitutional government
and staving off revolution-and where revolution, for its part, is
characterized as having the extirpation of religion as its principal
object.124 The question Burke addresses, then, is not how an estab-
lishment can contribute to the salvation of souls or the spiritual
health of the nation, but how it can contribute to the stability of
civil society.
The purpose of the establishment, Burke explains, is the "conse-
cration of the state." By this he does not mean that the state is holy
or exempt from criticism. On the contrary, it means that those who
hold power in the state are "infused" with the "sublime princi-
ple[" that "they should not look to the paltry pelf of the moment
nor to the temporary and transient praise of the vulgar, but to a
solid, permanent existence in the permanent part of their na-
ture. .. ""' Government must be viewed as a "holy function"-
not in the sense that it is above criticism, but in the sense that it
must conform, in "virtue and wisdom," to principles higher than
itself.126 The established church thus stands as a reminder that
those in power "act in trust, and that they are to account for their
conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author, and Founder
of society."' 27 It is a moral check on the abuse of power.
It is the democratic element in the English constitution, ac-
cording to Burke, that most needs this kind of check. Princes are
inherently more constrained because they must constantly win the
support and approbation of others. "[W]here popular authority is
absolute and unrestrained," however, "the people have an infi-
nitely greater, because a far better founded, confidence in their
own power." It is of "infinite importance," therefore, that the peo-
ple "should not be suffered to imagine that their will, any more
than that of kings, is the standard of right and wrong."'2 8 "When
they are habitually convinced that no evil can be acceptable ...
to him whose essence is good, [the people] will be better able to
extirpate out of the minds of all magistrates, civil, ecclesiastical, or
124 See Burke, Reflections at 80-90.
125 Id at 81.
I'l Id at 83.
127 Id at 81.
118 Id at 82.
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military, anything that bears the least resemblance to a proud and
lawless domination. "129
In particular, the function of the establishment is to ensure con-
tinuity with the established traditions of the society. By "taking
ground on that religious system of which we are now in posses-
sion," Burke explained, "we continue to act on the early received
and uniformly continued sense of mankind." 130 Religion makes us
aware that the civil order is but a part of the timeless moral order
ordained by the universal sovereign, and not the mere choice of
passing majorities. 3' Associate the state with the church, and the
people will not be so ready as they otherwise might be to "chang[e]
the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are
floating fancies or fashions." '132 To avoid
the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times
worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we
have consecrated the state, that no man should approach to
look into its defects or corruptions but with due caution, that
he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its sub-
version, that he should approach to the faults of the state as
to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solici-
tude.33
The established church is a bulwark against hasty and incautious
change.
This constitutional function explains why Burke insisted that the
church must have a privileged role in the public sphere. She must
"exalt her mitred front in courts and parliaments."' 13 4 To reduce
the church to one among many private, voluntary associations
would deprive it of the grandeur and public authority needed to
"show to the haughty potentates of the world ... that a free, a
generous, an informed nation honors the high magistrates of its
church; that it will not suffer the insolence of wealth and tides,
'9Id at 83.
130 Id at 80.
3 Id at 85. Burke returns to this theme in An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs
(1791), in 4 Works 57, 165-73.
" Burke, Reflections at 83.
"'Id at 84.
1 Id at 90.
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or any other species of proud pretension, to look down with scorn
upon what they looked up to with reverence."'3 5 A purely private
church would not, in Burke's estimation, perform its desired con-
stitutional role of reminding the wielders of political power that
their exercise of that power is limited by higher Authority.
Even on Burke's own premises, these would not be adequate
arguments for establishing religion in America. He insisted that in
these matters a "good statesman" will be guided by "circum-
stances"-"a knowledge of [the people's] opinions, prejudices,
habits, and all the circumstances that diversify and color life."' 3 6
He recognized that when an attempt is made to impose an estab-
lished church contrary to the "genius and desires" of the nation
(giving Scotland at the time of Charles I as an example, but surely
thinking of Ireland in his own time), such a "usurpation" will "ex-
cite[] a most mutinous spirit in that country.' 1 37 As a practical
constitutional prescription, Burke's combination of toleration and
establishment is suited only to countries in which a single religious
tradition is both numerically dominant and closely tied to the na-
tional culture and aspirations of the people. In such a case, com-
plete disestablishment may not be possible without a degree of
anticlericalism or hostility toward religion. Establishment cum tol-
eration may be the best practicable arrangement.
Burke may therefore speak more directly to some of the emerg-
ing democracies of Eastern Europe, or to the nations of Latin
America, than to the United States. Even in 1789, the United
States was a place of such extensive religious diversity, with such
regional variations in historical religious attachment, that a na-
tional religious establishment was out of the question. Even those
who supported establishment in their own states agreed that there
could be no establishment at the national level. In less than fifty
years after the founding, even state establishments became untena-
ble. As Burke predicted, where the established church did not re-
flect the opinions of the great majority of the people, it produced
"mutiny" rather than "virtue and wisdom." Burke himself would
135 Id. In this passage, Burke evinces the same respect mixed with disdain for aristocratic
pomp and privilege that he later reveals in his Letter to a Noble Lord (1796), in 5 Works
171.
136 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 45.
137 Burke, Speech on the Acts of Uniformity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 3, 8.
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not have advocated an establishment of religion in such a nation
as the United States.
But that does not mean the United States can do without what
Burke called "consecration." In an odd way, the Constitution of
the United States performs much the same role that the estab-
lished church performed in Burke's vision. The remedy against
hasty and incautious change is the written constitution. As Madi-
son stated in The Federalist No. 44:
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating pol-
icy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with
regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative in-
terferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares
to the more industrious and less informed part of the commu-
nity.... They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough
reform is wanting, which will... give a regular course to the
business of society. 8
The Constitution is our bulwark against change-our guarantee
that passing majorities, inflamed by "floating fancies or fashions,"
will not "destroy the entire fabric." And the Constitution itself is
protected by a quasi-religious status in the popular mind.13 9
Moreover, rather than an established church, it is our First
Amendment that most plainly serves as a reminder that legitimate
government is limited by the immutable principles of a higher Au-
thority. I have observed in another place that our Free Exercise
Clause stands as a recognition that even the democratic will of the
people is subordinate, in principle, to the commands of God as
perceived in the individual conscience, and that in such a nation,
with such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a philosophical
impossibility.' 4° As Madison put the point:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Soci-
ety, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the
Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into
"'Federalist 44 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 280, 282-83
(Mentor, 1961).
,' See Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L J 1290, 1294-95 (1937);
Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Supreme Court Re-
view 123, 123-24.
0 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1516 (1990).
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any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reserva-
tion of his duty to the general authority; much more must every
man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do
it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. 41
Religion-the recognition of an authority higher than the state-
is thus central to the constraint of governmental power in both
Burke's England and Madison's America, though Burke accom-
plishes this by incorporating the spiritual authority into the consti-
tution of the state while Madison does so by placing the conscience
of the individual above the civil authority. The two systems may
appear to be opposites, but the true opposite of both is the totali-
tarian system first introduced in France, where the state, embody-
ing the "general will," is the highest authority and both established
church and individual conscience are subjugated to it.
Burke's view of establishment illuminates his disagreement with
social contract theory, and thus with the more radical idea that
the people have the right, at any time, to alter or abolish their
form of government and to institute one more to their liking.
42
God-not the people-is the ultimate "institutor and author and
protector of civil society.' 1 43 God willed the state, and His will is
"the law of laws and the sovereign of sovereigns."' 144 In a famous
passage of the Reflections seemingly addressed to Locke, Burke con-
ceded that "Society is indeed a contract"-but that it "ought not
to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement
in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, or tobacco, or some other
such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest,
and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties." It must be "looked
on with other reverence." It is "a partnership not only between
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who
are dead, and those who are to be born." The authority of the
sovereign-even the people-is constrained by the immutable or-
der ordained by God. "Each contract of each particular state is
'
41James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, reprinted as
an appendix to Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 64 (1947) (Rutledge dissenting).
142 See Burke, An Appealfiom the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57, 120-21,
161-63, 183.
141 Burke, Reflections at 86.
144 Id.
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but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society...
according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath
which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their ap-
pointed place." This divine law, he wrote, is not subject to the
"will" of the people, who "are bound to submit their will to that
law." Thus, it is in a case of "the first and supreme necessity only,
a necessity that is not chosen but chooses," that a people have the
right to dissolve the bands of society. 4 The established church, in
Burke's view, is nothing more than "our recognition of a seigniory
paramount" 1 -a recognition, like that in the American Pledge of
Allegiance, that the nation is "under God" and therefore limited
and constrained in its use of power.
Thus, far from augmenting the authority of the sovereign, the
established church in Burke's vision is a means of limiting power.
It is noteworthy that Burke's assessment of the effect of the es-
tablishment in England was shared by his philosophical bUte noire,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau-though Rousseau deplored what Burke
celebrated. According to Rousseau, "the Kings of England have
made themselves heads of the Church,... but this tide has made
them less its masters than its ministers; they have gained not so
much the right to change it, as the power to maintain it.' ' 14 Thus
he concludes, to his disgust, that "[t]here are [ ] two powers, two
Sovereigns, in England .... ,148 To Rousseau, unlike Burke, this
division of authority between church and state is "clearly bad,"
because "all institutions that set man in contradiction to himself
are worthless." 49 The point of a civil religion, to Rousseau, is to
"unite[ ] the divine cult with love of the laws" and to "mak[e]
country the object of the citizens' adoration."' To Burke it is to
remind both the rulers and the people of the limitations of the
law and the obligations of the nation to a higher and more perma-
nent order.
'15 Id at 84-85.
'4 Id at 86.
1
7 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 132 (E. P. Dutton, 1950) (G. D. H. Cole,
trans).
"I Id at 133.
149Id at 134.
150 Id.
428 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
B. POLITICS AND RELIGION
The proper role of religion in the civil order was moral and
constitutional, according to Burke, rather than political. He did
not wish to see the church become involved in day-to-day politics
or in political agitation on particular issues. He had no respect for
what he called "political theologians and theological politicians. "151
"[P]olitics and the pulpit are terms that have little agreement," he
said. "The cause of civil liberty and civil government gains as little
as that of religion by this confusion of duties.... Surely the church
is a place where one day's truce ought to be allowed to the dissen-
sions and animosities of mankind."' 52 Burke observed that preach-
ers who enter the political realm frequently are "[w]holly unac-
quainted with the world in which they are so fond of meddling,
and inexperienced in all its affairs on which they pronounce with
so much confidence." The result, he said, is that "they have noth-
ing of politics but the passions they excite." M This promotes the
worst sort of ideological politics. On the other hand, he criticized
those who, on the basis of "but superficial studies in the natural
history of the human mind have been taught to look on religious
opinions as the only cause of enthusiastic zeal and sectarian propa-
gation." 1 a54 There is "no doctrine whatever," he warned, "that is
not capable of the very same effect."' 15 5 Indeed, while recognizing
that "[r]eligion is among the most powerful causes of enthusi-
asm,"' 56 Burke more often treated religion as a source of restraint,
stability, and order, and found the antireligious zealotry of the rev-
olutionaries far more frightening.
These positions may be driven more by Burke's view of politics
than Burke's view of religion, for to him politics was a matter of
prudence, caution, and experience; reliance on principles and ab-
stractions, divorced from "circumstances," is likely to produce op-
'51 Burke, Reflections at 10.
I Id at 10-11. See also Burke, Speech on the Repeal of the Test and Coyporation Acts (Mar
2, 1790), in 28 Parliamewtaiy Histoiy 432, 439 ("[H]e agreed with his right hon. friend that
the church and the pulpit ought to be kept pure and undefiled, and that politics should
not be adverted to in either. With equal propriety might theological discussions, he said,
be taken up in that House, and questions solely religious be debated there.").
,53 Burke, Reflections at 11.
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pression and folly.157 A religiously informed politics is, by its na-
ture, a principled politics: one in which statesmen will be distracted
from the real world of the possible by aspirations of the ideal. As
an explicit opponent of utopian politics, it is natural that Burke
would resist the force of religion, as he did any other form of poli-
tics driven by ideological principle. By the same token, it is only
natural that those who are engaged in the politics of social and
moral reform will find the language of religion a powerful means
for awakening national consciousness, and will disdain Burke's pol-
itics of prudential judgment and incremental change as an excuse
for the status quo.
In his disdain for mixing "politics and the pulpit," Burke also
revealed something of his understanding of the proper function of
religion in human affairs: not as a set of prescriptions for govern-
ment, but as a call to reflection and an antidote to politics based
on intellectual pride or self-interest. To borrow language from so-
cial critic Christopher Lasch, religion is not "a set of comprehen-
sive and unambiguous answers to ethical questions," but rather
"encourag[es] believers at every step to question their own mo-
tives.'" 8 "The very essence of religion," according to Lasch, is a
"spiritual discipline against self-righteousness. ' 1
"
9 This echoes
Burke's claim that religion is necessary to counteract the "arro-
gance, and selfopinion," as well as the "lust of selfish will," of
those who hold political power. 160
In modem controversies over the legitimacy of expressly reli-
gious argument in the formation of public policy, 16' both sides
might therefore draw support from Burke. On the one hand, Burke
criticized efforts to draw specific public policy prescriptions from
religion and to use instrumentalities of the church for political or-
ganizing. He would likely see the growth of religious political lob-
bies-whether of so-called "religious right," liberal "social gos-
pel," or radical "liberation theology"-as a dangerous (though
'71 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 41.
15
' Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy 243, 16 (Nor-
ton, 1995).
9 Id at 16.
,10 Burke, Reflections at 82, 83.
161 See, for example, Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford,
1995); Stephen L. Carter, The Cnlture of Disbelief (Basic Books, 1993).
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hardly novel '62) aspect of politics, as well as a divisive development
within the church. On the other hand, Burke would be unlikely
to agree with the theory-formerly espoused by the Supreme
Court-that political division along religious lines is uniquely divi-
sive, and hence that measures supported by religious groups are
for that reason constitutionally questionable. 163 Religious politics
are objectionable as a species of ideological politics, not because
of any special issues of "church and state."
C. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH
IN BURKE'S CONSTITUTION
Perhaps the most unusual feature of Burke's conception of the
established church is that it must enjoy a large measure of indepen-
dence from the government. This is unusual because with govern-
ment support for religion usually comes government control; in-
deed, England had a long-standing practice (with the theological
label of "Erastianism") of subordination of the church to the
state.'6 4 This enables the state to use the church as a subsidiary
instrument of social control and national unity. This is found, in
its most extreme form, in Hobbes.' t s Burke, however, insisted
(ahistorically) that the people of England have "made their church,
like their king and their nobility, independent."'6 6 This indepen-
dence is essential if the establishment is to perform its constitu-
tional function, he explained, for "[r]eligion, to have any force on
men's understandings, indeed to exist at all, must be supposed par-
amount to laws, and independent for its substance upon any hu-
man institution."'67 Moreover, it is essential that churches other
than the established church be free to govern themselves: "Never
I See McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618, 641 n 25 (1978) (Brennan concurring) ("[C]hurch
and religious groups in the United States have long exerted powerful political pressures on
state and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as slavery, war, gambling, drinking,
prostitution, marriage, and education.").
16 Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 622-23 (1971).
164 See generally Weldon S. Crowley, Erastianism in England to 1640, 32 J Church &
State 549 (1990).
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch 42-43 at 521-626 (Penguin, 1968) (originally published
1651) (C. B. Macpherson, ed).
'"' Burke, Reflections at 88.
167 Burke, Tract on the Popery Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 338.
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were the members of one religious sect fit to appoint the pastors
to another."'68
Burke thought that a properly ordered state church should take
its doctrinal bearings not from political determinations or theolog-
ical theory, but from "the established opinions and prejudices of
manldnd."' 69 The Anglican Church held its position in England
by prescription; it was the embodiment of the religious experience
of the English people over the centuries (as the Presbyterian
Church was of the Scottish and the Roman Catholic of the
Irish).'7 Burke's emphasis on prescription reflected the orthodox
conviction that the truths of revelation are not open to revision
by process of ordinary investigation and analysis: that the truths
of religion must be eternal if they are to be recognized as truths.
It was decidedly unorthodox, however, in locating authority not
in biblical text (the Protestant view) or apostolic succession (the
Catholic view), or even the government (the Erastian view), but
in the slowly evolving opinions of the nation.
Recognition of prescriptive authority protects the church from
rapid and improvident alteration and at the same time insulates it
from the will of the sovereign. More particularly, prescription in-
hibits use of the church as an instrument of revolutionary tyranny.
Although in theory Burke maintained that government has a "gen-
eral superintending control over... the publicly propagated doc-
trines of men,"'' he insisted that the conditions under which Par-
liament could properly exercise power over the doctrines of the
Church of England were exceedingly rare. "As an independent
church, professing fallibility, she has claimed a right of acting with-
out the consent of any other; as a church, she claims, and has al-
ways exercised, a right of reforming whatever appeared amiss in
her doctrine, her discipline, or her rites."'72 In support of this inde-
pendence, Burke invoked the ancient medieval principle, devel-
" Edmund Burke, Letter to a Peer of Ireland (Feb 21, 1782), in 4 Works 217, 234.
169Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 43.
"
0 See Letter from Edmund Burke to William Smith, Esq., on the Subject of Catholic Emancipa-
tion (Jan 29, 1795), in 6 Works 361, 368; Burke, Relections at 80. For Burke's famous defense
of the principle of prescription in political affairs, see Edmund Burke, Speech on a Motion
for a Committee to Inquire into the State of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament
(May 7, 1782), in 7 Works 89, 94-97.
M' Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 41.
"I Burke, Speech on the Acts of Unifonnity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 3, 7.
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oped in full form during the papacy of Gregory VII, of the "liberty
of the Church."'73 The power of Parliament over the doctrines of
the church is essentially declaratory rather than directive: to give
legal force and recognition to doctrinal change arising from the
institutional church itself or to correct "intolerable . . . abuse"
recognized as such by the majority of the people, whose church
it is. 74 It is better to tolerate "imperfection"-which will exist in
all human institutions-than to use the power of the state to bring
about frequent religious "alterations," which lead to "religious tu-
mults and religious wars."175
Independence is attained in the English system by endowing the
church with sufficient private property that it is dependent neither
upon "the unsteady and precarious contribution of individuals"
nor upon the vagaries of Parliamentary appropriation. "They [the
English people] certainly never have suffered, and never will suffer,
the fixed estate of the church to be converted into a pension, to
depend on the treasury and to be delayed, withheld, or perhaps
to be extinguished by fiscal difficulties .. ."176 As one dependent
on the largesse of others would know, such fiscal difficulties "may
sometimes be presented for political purposes."' 77 If the clergy de-
pended upon appropriations from the Parliament, rather than the
security of earnings from the lands of the church, they would be
subordinate to the civil authorities, and subject to their whim and
control. Thus,
[t]he people of England think that they have constitutional mo-
tives, as well as religious, against any project of turning their
independent clergy into ecclesiastical pensioners of state. They
tremble for their liberty, from the influence of a clergy depen-
M Id. On the "freedom of the church," see Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The
For-mation of the Western Legal Tradition 88-99, 105 (Harvard, 1983).
'7' Burke, Speech on the Acts of Unifornity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 3, 10.
171Id at 10-11.
'76 Burke, Reflections at 88.
177 Id. One might speculate that Burke's sensitivities on this score were heightened by
his own experience. Early in his career, he resigned an official pension of £300 per year
because it would have made him, in effect, a perpetual retainer to his then-employer, Wil-
liam Gerard Hamilton. Later in the same year, Burke unexpectedly inherited an estate of
approximately the same value-an inheritance that secured his independence to the same
extent that the earlier pension would have imperiled it. See MacKnight, 1 Life and Times
at 177-83 (cited in note 16). Though no commentator has noted the connection, Burke's
depiction of the situation of the church in the Reflections has a certain autobiographical
flavor.
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dent on the crown; they tremble for the public tranquillity
from the disorders of a factious clergy, if it were made to de-
pend upon any other than the crown." 8
It was this aspect of the establishment-the independence of the
church through its base of private property-that was the first ma-
jor casualty of the Revolution in France.
It is therefore not so clear as it might at first appear that Burke's
position was in opposition to that of the opponents of the proposed
Virginia Assessment Bill in 1785. That bill would, in effect, have
made clergy pensioners of the state. While Burke presumably
would not have agreed with Madison and Jefferson in their argu-
ment that the assessment would violate the conscience of the tax-
payer, he might well have agreed with their equally important ar-
gument that the assessment would undermine the independence
and vitality of the church. A Baptist declaration against religious
assessments observed that if the state provided a "Support for
Preachers of the Gospel," this would give the state a "Right to
regulate and dictate to; it may judge and determine who shall preach;
when and where they shall preach; and what they must preach."' 79
That was precisely what Burke wished to avoid; perhaps he would
have suggested that the assessment be shelved in favor of endowing
the churches with public lands-the approach taken by the federal
government in the Northwest Ordinance.
It was, I think, the independence of the church rather than its
financial needs that principally underlay Burke's refusal to leave
the church solely to the voluntary support of its members, as in
America. To be sure, Burke tended to assume that the motivation
for cutting the church off from public support was hostility to its
mission: "[t]hey who think religion of no importance to the state,"
he said, "have abandoned it to the conscience or caprice of the
individual; they make no provision for it whatsoever, but leave ev-
ery club to make, or not, a voluntary contribution towards its sup-
port, according to their fancies." 180 But as an economic proposi-
tion, it is debatable that public financial support is in the interest
"I Burke, Reflections at 88.
'9 Declaration of the Virginia Assodation of Baptists (Dec 25, 1776), in Julian P. Boyd, ed,
1 The Papers of Tbomas Jefferson 660, 661 (Princeton, 1950) (emphasis in original).
"'First Letterfimn Edmund Burke to Sir Herules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
257.
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of the church. Adam Smith made the plausible economic argument
that ministers of the gospel who "depend altogether for their sub-
sistence upon the voluntary contributions of their hearers" were
likely to be superior in "[t]heir exertion, their zeal and industry,"
to those who derive their support from a "fund to which the law
of their country may entitle them," whether it be a "landed estate,
a tythe or land tax, or [an] established salary or stipend."'' Burke
was a sophisticated student of economics, whose thinking paral-
leled and in some respects anticipated Smith's work.'82 If creation
of incentives for "zeal and industry" were all there were to it,
Burke likely would have been forced to agree with Smith. The
problem, from Burke's perspective, was that a voluntary system
renders the clergyman dependent on the popularity and regard of
his parishioners. From the perspective of his episcopal ecclesiol-
ogy, this is no better than dependence on the political authorities.
In America, where most Protestants adhered to some form of con-
gregational ecclesiology, they would naturally be less concerned
with this consequence of voluntarism.
There is reason to believe that Burke's (and Rousseau's) por-
trayal of the independence of the Church of England during this
period was greatly exaggerated. Appointment of church officers
and control over church benefices could hardly fail to give the gov-
ernment effective control. One historian has commented that "at
no other time [than the eighteenth century] was the influence of
state over church so great .... The privileged clergy were an inte-
gral part of the extravagant patronage network which dictated how
England was governed, and high office in the church was deter-
mined by political considerations. '"183 Burke's failure to acknowl-
edge this situation is particularly striking in light of his criticism
of the King's use of favors and offices to dominate the Parlia-
ment.8 4 The Reflections must be understood as Burke's portrayal
18 Adam Smith, V An Inquiy into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 740-
41 (Random House, 1937) (originally published 1776). Madison adopted this argument in
paragraph 7 of his Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted as an appendix to Everson, 330 US
at 63, 67-68 (Rutledge dissenting), and the experience of religious vitality in America would
seem to bear out Smith's prediction. See Gary M. Anderson, Mr. Smith and the Preachers:
The Economics of Religion in "The Wealth of Nations," 96 J Pol Econ 1066 (1988).
l5' See Donald Barrington, Edmund Burke as an Economist, 21 Economica 252 (1954).
183 Eric J. Evans, The Contentions Tithe: The Tithe Problem and English Agriculture, 1750-
1850 2 (Routledge, 1976).
" See, for example, Edmund Burke, Speech on the Plan for Economical Refort (Feb 11,
1780), in 2 Works 265.
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of the ideal type of the English constitution, often in romantic and
exaggerated terms-not as a hardheaded analysis of the realities.
Burke's insistence on the independence of the church is one
point in common with American constitutional principles. The Su-
preme Court has stated that "religious organizations . . . [have]
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, mat-
ters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." '
But for Burke, church independence was a matter of "equitable
discretion" rather than legal right."8 6 He did not deny that Parlia-
mentary interference with church doctrine would be "most legal,"
but argued only that it would be "unwise or unwarrantable." I 7
From an American perspective, it seems dubious to suppose that
an established church, dependent on the equitable discretion of
the government, could ever have the degree of independence
Burke deemed necessary.
D. TOLERATION, COERCION, AND ESTABLISHMENT
Burke presupposed that an established church could be tolerant
and, for the most part, noncoercive. "I am persuaded that tolera-
tion, so far from being an attack upon Christianity, becomes the
best and surest support that possibly can be given to it," Burke
declared."88 Burke's established church was one that had made
peace with Roman Catholicism,'89 allowed persons of various doc-
trinal persuasion to "five quietly under the same roof,"' and had
embraced toleration as "a part of Christianity. '"191 In this, Burke
'8sKedroff v St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94, 116 (1952).
luBurke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 42.
187 Id.
'" Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 25. There is some reason to doubt that the tolerant establishment in Britain was, in
actuality, as tolerant as Burke suggested it could be. See Jonathan Bush, "Include Me Out":
Some Lessons of Religious Toleration in Britain, 12 Cardozo L Rev 881 (1991). But then, it
was not until the 1840s that Britain could be said to have adopted Burke's recommendation
for extending toleration to Catholics and Jews. See Henriques, Religious Toleration at 4-5,
136-205 (cited in note 2).
11 Burke, Reftections at 79 ("Violently condemning neither the Greek nor the Arme-
nian, nor, since heats are subsided, the Roman system of religion, we prefer the Protes-
tant .... ).
110 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 29.
191 Id at 25.
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can be seen as the voice of the road not taken in America, for at
the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, almost half the
states had some form of established church, all of which attempted
to combine official support for religion with broad toleration and
respect for diversity of sects. 92 By the 1830s, this attempt had been
abandoned, and disestablishmentarianism prevailed in every state,
later becoming a principle of national constitutional law through
the Fourteenth Amendment.'93 Most modem American commen-
tators (myself included) tend to assume that a prohibition on estab-
lishments is necessary as a backstop for full freedom of religion
(whether or not disestablishment serves other, more institutional,
values). Burke challenges that assumption by linking establishment
together with toleration. "Zealous as I am for the principle of an
establishment," he said, "I would have toleration a part of estab-
lishment, as a principle favorable to Christianity, and as a part of
Christianity.,' 19 4 This meant that the establishment could not use
direct coercion against Dissenters with regard to matters of con-
science. In this, Burke resembles modem American commentators
(and jurists) who interpret the Establishment Clause as directed
primarily, if not exclusively, at the evil of religious coercion.
In part, Burke's rejection of direct coercion as an instrument of
the established church was connected to his general advocacy of
toleration, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next sec-
tion. He wrote that "[i]f ever there was anything to which, from
reason, nature, habit, and principle, I am totally averse, it is perse-
cution for conscientious difference in opinion."' Perhaps more
importantly, however, Burke maintained that persecution could
undermine-but could not effectually support-religion. If it is
the purpose of the establishment to promote religion, he main-
tained, coercive means would be counterproductive. In the Tract
on the Popery Laws, he denied
" See McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1436-37, 1455-58 (cited in note 140). Burke's
views bear a strong resemblance to those of Joseph Story. See Joseph Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States § 988 at 700 (Carolina, 1987) (originally published
1833).
191 See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Incorporation of
the Nonestablishment Principle, 28 Ariz St L J (forthcoming 1996).
"" Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 25.
' Burke, Speech on the Acts of Uniformity (Feb 6, 1772), in 7 Works 3, 10.
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that it is in a man's moral power to change his religion when-
ever his convenience requires it. If he be beforehand satisfied
that your opinion is better than his, he will voluntarily come
over to you, and without compulsion, and then your law would
be unnecessary; but if he is not so convinced, he must know
it is his duty in this point to sacrifice his interest here to his
opinion of his eternal happiness, else he could have in reality
no religion at all.'96
As Conor Cruise O'Brien has pointed out, this passage has a "poi-
gnant ring," in light of the probable fact that Burke's father was
one of those who betrayed his "duty" by sacrificing his "opinion
of his eternal happiness" to the necessitudes of legal practice-
and that Burke himself could pursue his political career only on
account of that betrayal. 197 Perhaps that is why, in a letter to his
son written thirty years after he wrote the Tract, Burke stated:
Strange it is, but so it is, that men, driven by force from their
habits in one mode of religion, have, by contrary habits, under
the same force, often quietly settled in another. They suborn
their reason to declare in favor of their necessity. Man and his
conscience cannot always be at war. If the first races have not
been able to make a pacification between the conscience and
the convenience, their descendants come generally to submit
to the violence of the laws, without violence to their minds.' 9
This, too, has an autobiographical ring, perhaps more authentic
than the first-and more realistic. It is hard to deny that govern-
ment power, executed prudently and effectively, can have an in-
fluence on opinion. But this insight made Burke all the more op-
posed to religious persecution, such as he witnessed in Ireland.
The Penal Laws were not devised to encourage conversion to An-
glicanism, Burke pointed out, but solely to encourage apostasy
from Catholicism. "What do the Irish statutes?" he asked. "They
do not make a conformity to the established religion, and to its
doctrines and practices, the condition of getting out of servitude.
No such thing. Let three millions of people but abandon all that
they and their ancestors have been taught to believe sacred, and
to forswear it publicly in terms the most degrading, scurrilous, and
'1 Burke, Tract on the Popeyy Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 335.
' O'Brien, The Great Melody at 42-43 (cited in note 13).
Letter from Edmund Burke to Richard Burke, Esq. on Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland
(1793), in 6 Works 285, 395.
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indecent for men of integrity and virtue, and to abuse the whole
of their former lives, and to slander the education they have re-
ceived, and nothing more is required of them." '199 The "deeper
evil," Burke perceived, was not persecution, but that the persecu-
tion was purely destructive."0 The Protestant Ascendancy in Ire-
land had this in common with the atheist philosophers of France
and the Radical Dissenters of England: in each case, the object is
not to convert the people to a better and truer religion, but to
destroy traditional religious faith and leave in its place only a
"dreadful void." 0' 1 He deemed it "madness and folly" to drive men
"from any positive religion whatever into the irreligion of the times,
and its sure concomitant principles of anarchy."' ' 2
Burke thus rejected coercion as a means of maintaining the es-
tablishment. This meant that government power over religion was
limited; it could give support and encouragement to beliefs that
already were widely held, but could not impose beliefs on an un-
willing populace. "Religion," he said, "is not believed because the
laws have established it, but it is established because the leading
part of the community have previously believed it to be true. '23
He nonetheless recognized that "men must believe their religion
upon some principle or other, whether of education, habit, theory,
or authority. ' '2°4 One important means of supporting religion is
through education. He noted that "[o]ur education is in a manner
wholly in the hands of ecclesiastics, and in all stages from infancy
to manhood." By this means, "we attach our gentlemen to the
church. 2 5 Burke thus allowed government to use its prestige and
its resources to promote religion, and to give special status to the
church established by law, but not to punish those who refused to
conform or to penalize those who sought spiritual sustenance in
another denomination. "[T]oleration," he wrote, "does not ex-
clude national preference, either as to modes, or opinions; and all
I" Id at 396 (emphasis in original).
200 Id at 3 93-94.
201 Id at 395.
202 Burke, Letter on the Affairs of Ireland (1797), in 6 Works 413, 426 (emphasis in original).
203 Burke, Tract on the Popery Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 338.
204 Letter fi'om Edmund Burke to Richard Burke, Esq. on Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland
(1793), in 6 Works 385, 395.
I" Burke, Reflections at 87.
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the lawful and honest means which may be used for the support
of that preference.""2 6
While these forms of "preference" may be far less oppressive
than overt persecution, however, it remains true that they involve
coercion of a sort, especially the coercion of taxation, which has
been at the forefront of American controversies over church and
state. Burke's position on the coercive aspects of the establishment
was less than satisfactory. The right of the church to compel pay-
ment of tithes, for example, was the most irksome and unpopular
aspect of the establishment during this period, and did more to
bring the church into conflict and disrepute with the ordinary peo-
ple of England than any other.0 7 The tithe was in effect a tax,
typically a tenth, on agricultural production and sometimes on the
fruits of commerce or labor, with numerous and chaotic exceptions
resting on custom, precedent, statute, and case law. Far from unit-
ing the people and fostering respect for the divine representatives
on earth, the tithing system led to widespread public disaffection
and an appearance (if not the reality) of clerical oppressiveness.2"8
It could not have escaped Burke's attention that this system was
inimical to his vision of the role of the church. His only direct
comments on the tithe, in a letter to his son, evinced great sympa-
thy for Irish farmers who resisted the exaction.0 9 Burke presum-
ably found it difficult to attack the tithing system outright, how-
ever, for in legal form the tithes were an appurtenance of real
property, of ancient provenance, not much different in their legal
standing than any other nonpossessory property interest.210 Thus,
in his defense of the establishment we may perceive a discreet si-
lence about the tithe. Instead, he argued optimistically that a
greater security of the real property of the church might render
206 Letter fiwn Edmund Burke to William Burgh (Feb 9, 1775), in 3 Correspondence 110,
112.
207 See generally Evans, The Contentious Tithe (cited in note 183).
218 It was also an inefficient and counterproductive tax, as it discouraged both the improve-
ments of the landlord and the cultivation of the farmer, as Adam Smith pointed out. Smith,
V The Wealtb of Nations at 789. Given Burke's attention to issues of public economics, and
general agreement with Smith on such matters, it is likely that he was aware of this critique.
2
'9 Letter fivom Edmund Burke to Richard Burke, Esq. on Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland
(1793), in 6 Works 385, 399-400.
"'0Evans, The Contentious Tithe at 8-9, 17 (cited in note 183). About one-third of the
rights to tithes were owned by private persons, most of them derived from the sale of
monastic properties at the time of Henry VIII. Id at 12, 17.
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the collection of tithes less vital: "I heartily wish to see the Church
secure in such possessions as will not only enable her ministers to
preach the Gospel with ease, but of such a kind as will enable them
to preach it with its full effect, so that the pastor shall not have
the inauspicious appearance of a tax-gatherer."21' So, Burke
"wished" for an alternative, but made no protest against the tithe.
As with the issue of religious participation in politics, various
positions in the American controversy over the importance of "co-
ercion" as an aspect of establishment 2 ' can draw some support
from Burke. Those who hold that coercion is a necessary element
in finding an unconstitutional establishment will agree with
Burke's position that coercion, rather than endorsement or general
support, is the evil to be avoided. Those who hold that noncoercive
government action can constitute an establishment can point out
that Burke's advocacy of a noncoercive establishment precisely
proves their point. And still others can point to Burke's ambiva-
lence about tithes and imprecision in the use of the term "coer-
cion" to show that the very meaning of "coercion" is too uncertain
to be a useful category for deciding whether there is impermissible
government support of religion.
E. WHY BURKE AND THE AMERICANS REACHED DIFFERENT
CONCLUSIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
What accounts for the difference between Burke and the Ameri-
cans regarding the separation of church and state? Differences in
circumstances surely account for a large part of the difference. But
there are reasons of a more theoretical nature, as well.
First, a central tenet of the American rights tradition (especially
under the First Amendment) is what one commentator calls the
"postulate of distrust." '213 As Jefferson wrote in the Kentucky
Resolutions:
"' Edmund Burke, Speech on Dorvnant Claims of the Church (Feb 17, 1772), in 7 Works
137, 142. Burke's optimism had some basis in fact: during the last half of the eighteenth
century, there was a "decisive shift in the source of income of many of the better endowed
clergy" from tithes to direct ownership of land. Evans, The Contentious Tithe at 8 (cited in
note 183).
2 See Board of Education ofKiiyasjoel v Grumet, 114 S Ct 2481, 2499 (1994) (O'Connor
concurring); Lee v Weimian, 505 US 577, 587, 592-97 (1992); County of Allegheny v ACLU,
492 US 573, 659-62 (1989) (Kennedy concurring in part).
213 Richard A. Epstein, Proper-ty, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, in Geoffrey R. Stone,
Richard A. Epstein, and Cass R. Sunstein, eds, The Bill of Rights in the Modern State 41,
48 (Chicago, 1992).
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[li]t would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the
men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of our
rights; that confidence is every where the parent of despotism;
free government is founded in jealousy, and not in confidence;
it is jealousy, and not confidence, which prescribes limited con-
stitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust
with power. 14
On much the same logic, Madison, in his Memorial and Remon-
strance against Religious Assessments, wrote that
it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liber-
ties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citi-
zens, and one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolu-
tion. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power
had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question
in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle,
and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle.215
To Burke, such an attitude would seem pathological. It is not
possible to achieve the beneficent purposes of government if the
very potential for abuse is treated as a reason for withdrawal of
confidence. "You can hardly state to me a case to which legislature
is the most confessedly competent, in which, if the rules of benig-
nity and prudence are not observed, the most mischievous and op-
pressive things may not be done." '216 There is no alternative to
confidence. It is "a moral and virtuous discretion, and not any ab-
stract theory of right, which keeps governments faithful to their
ends." '217 Questions of abuse of power should be examined in light
of context and circumstance-and not rigid and acontextual princi-
ples. He therefore insisted that toleration should be understood
not as a matter of universal human rights, but as "a part of moral
and political prudence."1 Burke maintained that the government
should pursue a broad policy of toleration, reserving to itself the
authority to intervene in cases of genuine danger to the "peace,
214 Kentucky Resolutions (Nov 10, 1798), in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, 5 The
Founders' Constitution 131, 133 (Chicago, 1987).
21S Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted as an appendix to Everson, 330 US at
65 (Rutledge dissenting).
16 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 42.
217 Id.
"1 First Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
258.
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order, liberty, and... security" of society.219 He judged claims for
toleration on their individual merits, in light of "the peculiar and
characteristic situation of a people," and his "knowledge of their
opinions, prejudices, habits, and all the circumstances that diversify
and color life. '2" He adhered to this approach not only with re-
gard to the Unitarians, whom he distrusted, but with regard to the
Irish Catholics, whom he did not. Thus, in arguing for representa-
tion of Catholics in the Irish Parliament, he insisted that "I do
not put the thing on a question of right," that "the whole question
comes before Parliament as a matter for its prudence," and that
the issue was one of "discretion. "22
Americans had no such reticence about framing issues in terms
of rights. Despite wide disagreement on questions of establish-
ment, there was seemingly universal consensus that liberty of con-
science or the free exercise of religion was a natural and inalienable
right.222 Where Burke's approach was flexible and contextual,
allowing a prudent discretion to government officials to evaluate
the facts of the case, the Madisonian-Jeffersonian ideal was driven
by articulated principle and a pervasive distrust of government. In
this, Burke resembles certain Justices on the modem Supreme
Court, who eschew the discovery or articulation of any general
principles to guide decision making in the church-state area, in
favor of contextual, fact-specific decision making.23 This gives
government and courts more latitude to adjust policies in light of
"9 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 44.
220 Id at 45.
221 First Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
292. Similarly, in an essay entitled On the State of Ireland, written for Secretary of State
Henry Dundas, Burke wrote, speaking for the Catholic Committee:
[T]he Roman Catholics ask a share in the privilege of election; not as a matter
of speculative right, not upon general principles of liberty, or as a conclusion from
any given premises, either of natural or even of constitutional right. They ask it
as a protection, and a requisite security which they now have not, for the exercise
of legal right. They ask it from a practical sense of the evils they feel by being
excluded from it. It is necessary for the free enjoyment of their industry and prop-
erty, to secure a fair dispensation of justice, both criminal and civil and to secure
them that just estimation and importance, without which, in human tribunals, they
cannot obtain it.
4 Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke 65, 67 (F. & J. Kivington, 1844).
22 See McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1455-56 (cited in note 140).
223 See Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors, Univ Va, 115 S Ct 2512, 2526 (1995) (O'Connor
concurring).
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circumstance, rather than to adopt determinate "principles" to
cabin the discretion of court or legislature.
Second, Burke could not share the assumption, common among
Americans, that there is a fundamental distinction between matters
of spiritual and temporal concern. The ideal of "separation of
church and state" presupposes that we can-in Locke's words-
"distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of
religion. 224 This is reflected in Jefferson's metaphorical "Wall of
Separation."
But what if we cannot? What if "civil government" and "reli-
gion" are both legitimately involved in many of the same things?
Burke claimed that the government cannot be "remote and indif-
ferent" to anything that has an effect on the "concerns of men."22
At the same time, Burke described religion as "one great source
of civilization amongst us" and as "the basis of civil society. 22 6 "If
religion only related to the individual, and was a question between
God and the conscience, it would not be wise, nor in my opinion
equitable, for human authority to step in."227 But, Burke wrote,
"[i]t is the interest, and it is the duty, and because it is the interest
and the duty, it is the right of government to attend much to opin-
ions; because, as opinions soon combine with passions, even when
they do not produce them, they have much influence on ac-
tions. ' It is therefore impossible for the people as a whole to
lay down as a "universal proposition" that "nothing relative to reli-
gion was your concern." 9
At the time of the American Founding, it may have appeared
that the limited peacekeeping functions of the state could be dis-
tinguished from the more elevated functions of the church.
Whether that was an accurate perception even then may be de-
bated, but as the modern state has expanded its attentions to more
and more aspects of life, previously private and frequently reli-
gious, Burke's position more closely resembles the reality. What
224 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 The Works of John Locke 5, 9 (Thomas
Davison, 1823).
I's Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 43.
I" Burke, Reflections at 80, 79.
"' Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 48.
"I Id at 44.
119 Id at 46.
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belongs to the governmental side of the Wall, and what to the
religious? Education? Public health? Domestic relations? Charity?
Character building? Art? The just conduct of war? Modem com-
mentators, in contrast to the Jeffersons and Madisons of the
Founding, typically accept as necessary and inevitable that govern-
ments will intervene to mold the beliefs and attitudes of the peo-
ple, on everything from smoking to gender bias.230 No longer does
it seem heterodoxical to say that government should "attend much
to opinions." But if Burke is right and Locke is wrong-if it is
not possible to "distinguish exactly the business of civil government
from that of religion"-how can a constitutional principle based
on "separation" of the religious and civil spheres be made to work?
The difference here lies not so much in Burke's conception of
the established church, but in his broader conception of govern-
ment. There is a close, but generally unrecognized, connection be-
tween the idea of the "Wall of Separation" and the idea of a radi-
cally limited government. Once government shakes off its limited
role and concerns itself with the general welfare of the people,
including their cultural and intellectual lives, it has leapt the
"Wall" and entered the traditional sphere of religion. In contrast
to many of our Founders, Burke had a more modern conception
of the jurisdiction of the state, which did not permit him the easy
answer of a "Wall of Separation." If the government is "a partner-
ship in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every
virtue and in all perfection, 231 then it necessarily will be conveying
a collective teaching on science, art, virtue, and perfection
(whether we label the teaching a "religion" or not). It follows not
that an establishment is desirable, but that it is inescapable. Some
sort of opinions necessarily will guide the state in its "superin-
tending control over . . . the publicly propagated doctrines of
men." 3 ' If the Jeffersonian-Madisonian ideal of the limited state
is abandoned as naive or outmoded, then the serious questions be-
come how to protect against arbitrary or tyrannical use of this
power and how to respect the legitimate rights of those who dis-
,30 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev
943 (1995).
231 Burke, Reflections at 85.
232 Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), 7 Works 42.
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agree with the official orthodoxy. Burke's prescription-to limit
governmental power by encouraging it to adhere to teachings
broadly accepted by the public, preserved through diffuse institu-
tions largely independent of the central state, to restrict it to non-
coercive means, and to give broad toleration to dissenters-could
possibly be the least dangerous alternative.
1I. TOLERATION
As has already been seen, Burke supported establishment
but had a commitment to toleration that was equally strong if not
stronger. This was an atypical stance for his day. At risk of over-
simplification, the positions on establishment and toleration at that
time may be divided into three camps. 3 First were the evangelical
separationists-a position that barely existed in Britain at this time,
but was highly influential in America. Evangelical separationists in
America, led by the Baptists, opposed the establishment both be-
cause they deemed it erroneous on theological grounds and be-
cause they thought government support rendered the clergy sub-
servient to the state; and they supported the widest possible
toleration or free exercise in matters of religion because they con-
sidered religion to be the central and most important activity of
life. Second were the secularists-relatively rare in America, apart
from Jefferson, but influential in England. Led by so-called "Ra-
tional Dissenters" like Richard Price and Joseph Priestly, they
were superficially aligned with the evangelical separationists-both
opposed the establishment-but the secularists sought to reduce
the role of revealed religion in public life and generally believed
that scientific ideas should supplant the superstition and nonratio-
nalistic religion of the past. While the evangelical separationists
stressed that religion is too sacred to be subject to human interfer-
ence, the secularists maintained that religion is-or should be-
irrelevant to the state. Third were the establishmentarians, such
as Lord North and William Blackstone. By Burke's day, it was de
rigileur to recognize a degree of toleration as part of the establish-
ment; but this toleration was typically grudging, and held to a nar-
233 These positions are set forth in greater detail and nuance in Henriques, Religious Toler-
ation (cited in note 2).
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row compass. In actual disputes over the extension of toleration,
the establishmentarians were almost invariably opposed.234
A. TOLERATION OF CATHOLICS AND NON-CHRISTIANS
It should be noted that adherents of none of these positions had
much enthusiasm for toleration of Roman Catholics, the most
burning religious issue of the era. To the evangelicals, Catholicism
represented the gravest of theological error; to the secularists and
Rational Dissenters, Catholicism was superstitious and unenlight-
ened;235 to the establishmentarians, the constitutional status of the
Protestant religion was a central tenet of the Glorious Revolution.
It was widely held that the Glorious Revolution of 1688-the po-
litical heritage of Burke's Whig Party-was a victory over Papism,
and thus that the suppression of Catholicism was part of the funda-
mental constitutional fabric of the realm, at least as long as Catho-
lics maintained their potentially subversive loyalty to a foreign
power, the Pope in Rome.236 Antipathy toward Papists was wide-
spread, and was one of the few attitudes that evangelical separa-
tionists, secularists, and establishmentarians had in common.
The perennial argument against admission of Catholics to the
rights of citizens was that they were disloyal to the British govern-
ment-that because of either their lingering loyalties to the Stuart
line or their allegiance to the Pope in Rome, they might be ex-
234 See generally G. U. Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688-1730 (1975).
Opposition to the extension of toleration proceeded along two dimensions. First, establish-
mentarians were disposed to support toleration only for those whose ideas were reasonably
close to the national consensus. Thus, dissenting clergy who affirmed thirty-six of the
Thiry-Nine Articles were freely permitted to preach, while those who dissented more fun-
damentally were (at least in theory) not. This was the issue involved in Burke's Speech on
a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works 21. Second, tolerant
establishmentarians generally supported extension of the protection of natural rights to
Dissenters, but resisted extension of the equal benefits of government action. See Philip
A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection
and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 Supreme Court Review 295, 318-22.
"I As late as 1787, Dissenters' propaganda excused the Test Act as a safeguard against
Popery, and sought to show that no such safeguard was needed against Protestants. See
Henriques, Religious Toleration at 91 (cited in note 2). Conor Cruise O'Brien has pointed
out that Burke's fury at Richard Price was driven partly by the latter's anti-popery rhetoric.
Great Melody at 395.
36 See Henriques, Religious Toleration (cited in note 2) at 57, 77-79 (describing the Tory
theory that the Corporation and Test Acts were "fundamental laws" of the Union). Burke
summarizes this argument in his First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4
Works 241, 245, and refutes it, id at 257-70.
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pected to side with the Catholic powers of Europe in conflict with
the King. As Blackstone argued:
If once they [Papists] could be brought to renounce the su-
premacy of the pope, they might quietly enjoy their seven sac-
raments, their purgatory, and auricular confession; their wor-
ship of reliques and images; nay even their transubstantiation.
But while they acknowledge a foreign power, superior to the
sovereignty of the kingdom, they cannot complain if the laws
of that kingdom will not treat them upon the footing of good
subjects.237
These suspicions were all the stronger with regard to the Catholics
of Ireland, who might, in addition to any disloyalty arising from
their Catholicism, be expected to chafe against their subordination
to the English and to the Protestant ruling class.
Burke strenuously sought to refute these claims. Burke referred
to the idea of the Pope as a dangerous foreign power as a "commo-
dious bugbear"-an idea that, if it "were clearly brought forth and
defined, [ ] would meet with nothing but scorn and derision."23
He pointed to recent events in England and Canada to prove that
the Catholic citizens had "cast off all foreign views and connec-
tions" and had resolved to "stand or fall with their country." '239
He could not, of course, deny that the Catholics of Ireland were
restive under the current regime, but the "real cause" of the disor-
ders in Ireland was not their Catholicism; it was their persecution.
The Irish Popery Laws
divided the nation into two distinct bodies, without common
interest, sympathy, or connection. One of these bodies was to
possess all the franchises, all the property, all the education:
the other was to be composed of drawers of water and cutters
of turf for them. Are we to be astonished, when, by the efforts
of so much violence in conquest, and so much policy in regula-
tion, continued without intermission for near an hundred years,
we had reduced them to a mob . . .?'0
137Blackstone, 4 Blackstone's Commentaries at 55 (cited in note 39).
23 8First Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
280-81.
239 Burke, Speech at Bristol, Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780), in 2 Works 365, 400
(describing the outpouring of Catholic support for the Crown during the American Revolu-
tion). See also First Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4
Works 241, 304 (describing the loyalty of Canadian Catholic citizens).
140 First Letter frmn Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrisbe (Jan 3, 1792), in 4 Works 241,
246-47.
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Although Burke's most passionate commitment to toleration in-
volved the Catholics of Ireland, he extended the principle to other
Dissenters from the established church as well. He advocated tolera-
tion for all of what he called "serious religion." He explained that
[e]ven the man who does not hold revelation, yet who wishes
that it were proved to him, who observes a pious silence with
regard to it, such a man, though not a Christian, is governed
by religious principles. Let him be tolerated in this country.
Let it be but a serious religion, natural or revealed, take what
you can get. Cherish, blow up the slightest spark: one day it
may be a pure and holy flame.241
Burke attacked the hypocrisy of those who condemned the perse-
cution of Protestants in Catholic France but excused the persecu-
tion of Catholics in Ireland. How could they "persuade themselves
that what was bad policy in France can be good in Ireland, or that
what was intolerable injustice in an arbitrary monarch becomes...
an equitable procedure in a country professing to be governed by
law"?2 42 To Burke it was absurd to maintain "that the names of
Protestant and Papist can make any change in the nature of essen-
tial justice. '243 "Toleration is good for all, or it is good for
none.
' 24
In his First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, Burke wrote that
"[t]oleration, being a part of moral and political prudence, ought
to be tender and large. A tolerant government ought not to be
too scrupulous in its investigations, but may bear without blame,
not only very ill-grounded doctrines, but even many things that
are positively vices. ' 245 In 1775, Burke stated his desire to give
"full civil protection," including freedom of worship and religious
education, to "Jews Mahometans and even pagans. ' '246 In this, he
was more than fifty years ahead of his day. To be sure, Burke (like
others of his era) was not above the occasional anti-Semitic re-
"' Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 37.
141 Burke, Tract on the Popeiy Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 329-330.
141 Id at 329.
244 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 29.
141 Reprinted in 4 Works 241, 258.
246 Letter from Edmund Burke to William Burgh (Feb 9, 1775), in 3 Correspondence 110,
112.
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mark,2 47 and he undertook no specific Parliamentary action to re-
peal the laws against Judaism in England. But in Parliament he
declared that the Jews are a people whom it was the special object
of humanity to protect rather than abuse,248 and in a letter to a
Catholic friend, Burke commended the Austrian Emperor's exten-
sion of toleration to the Jews and indicated his support for such
a measure in England-while opining that the nation was not yet
ready for it, and that it could not pass without ministerial sup-
port.
2 49
Burke devoted more than a decade of his life to fighting oppres-
sion in India, through his attacks on the East India Company and
his prosecution of Warren Hastings. His principal efforts involved
civil oppression and economic exploitation of the Indian people,
but he did not fail to recognize and resist religious oppression as
well. In a letter to a prominent English Protestant dissenter, Burke
described his efforts against Hastings as "endeavoring ... to re-
lieve twenty Millions of Dissenters from the Church of England,
in Asia from real grievances, which God forbid any of the Dissent-
ers in Europe [should suffer]. ' 20 He inveighed against the East
India Company's "indignities to the Indian Priesthood." 25' He
studied Halhed's code of Hindu law intently in preparation for his
case against Warren Hastings and-according to Charles James
Fox-"spoke of the piety of the Hindoos with admiration, and of
their holy religion and sacred functions with an awe bordering on
devotion." '252 In his opening speech against Hastings, Burke stated:
"We must not think to force [Hindus] into the narrow circle of
our ideas; we must extend ours to take in their system of opinions
and rites."2"
247 See Burke, Reflections at 42 (ugly comparison of French revolutionaries to "Jew
brokers").
241 Edmund Burke, Speech on a Motion Relating to the Seizure and Confiscation of Private
Property in the Island of St. Eustatius (May 14, 1781), in 22 Parliamentary History 218, 223-
26.
4'See Mahoney, Burke and Ireland at 113 (cited in note 38).
2s0 Letter from Edmund Burke to Richard Bright (May 8-9, 1789), in 5 Correspondence 470,
470.
51 Henry Richard Lord Holland, I Memoirs of the Whig Party 5-6 (Longman, Brown,
1852).
252 Id at 6.
1
53 Edmund Burke, Speech in Opening the Impeachment of Warren Hastings (Feb 15, 1788),
in 9 Works 327, 379.
450 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Burke was, however, ambivalent about new religions. "The only
faint shadow of difficulty" with regard to religious toleration, he
wrote in his first work on the subject, the Tract on the Popery Laws,
"is concerning the introduction of new opinions. 25 4 While new
opinions may have been "favorable to the cause of truth," ac-
cording to Burke, "[e]xperience has shown" that they are not "al-
ways conducive to the peace of society." Not only are new reli-
gious sects typically prone to "tumultuous and disorderly zeal,"
but they also are "the cause of the bitterest dissensions in the com-
monwealth" on account of their resistance to the present establish-
ment."' While Burke did not ultimately find this to be a sufficient
basis for persecution, he could understand why it might persuade
"a man of sense and of integrity. "256 Some thirty years later,
Burke's suspicion and distaste for new religions-this time the
Unitarian Society-had only increased: "Old religious factions are
volcanoes burnt out; on the lava and ashes and squalid scorix of
old eruptions grow the peaceful olive, the cheering vine, and the
sustaining corn. . . .But when a new fire bursts out, a face of
desolations comes on, not to be rectified in ages."2 s7 Therefore,
he said, "when men come before us, and rise up like an exhalation
from the ground, they come in a questionable shape," and we must
"try whether their intents be wicked or charitable, whether they
bring airs from heaven or blasts from hell."2 8
B. BURKE'S ARGUMENTS FOR TOLERATION
To some extent, Burke's arguments for toleration resembled
those typically offered in enlightened circles. Persecution was
cruel, ineffective, hypocritical, and bad for business.5 9 In typical
Enlightenment fashion, Burke argued that "[i]t is not permitted
to us to sacrifice the temporal good of any body of men to our
254 Burke, Tract on the Popery Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 336.
25s Id.
256 Id at 336-37.
257 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 46.
258 Id.
259 On the latter point, see Burke, Speech at Bristol, Previous to the Election (Sept 6, 1780),
in 2 Works 365, 406 (making argument that Catholics were among the "best manufacturers"
in England and might be forced to emigrate to Holland if the Penal Laws were not
reformed).
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own ideas of the truth and falsehood of any religious opinions. 260
Burke expressed these points with his usual panache, but the sub-
stance of the arguments is not much different from that in other
reformers of his era. Certainly, experience showed that the perse-
cution of Catholics in Ireland was ineffectual: "Ireland, after al-
most a century of persecution, is at this hour full of penalties and
full of Papists. '261 The effect of the Penal Laws was not to per-
suade, convert, or uplift, but merely to injure. "We found the peo-
ple heretics and idolaters; we have, by way of improving their con-
dition, rendered them slaves and beggars: they remain in all the
misfortune of their old errors, and all the superadded misery of
their recent punishment. 2 62
Burke's advocacy of toleration, however, was antithetical to the
Enlightenment project of secularization of society. For many advo-
cates of toleration, this was part of the effort to reduce the power
of "superstition" and to confine religion to the merely private.
Burke, by contrast, advocated toleration as a means of fostering
religion and enlarging its role in public life. In this, Burke had
something in common with the Baptist and other evangelical advo-
cates of religious freedom who were so influential in the move-
ments for disestablishment and free exercise in the American
states. Burke was well aware that some persons advocated tolera-
tion out of "a cold apathy, or indeed rather a savage hatred, to all
Religion, and an avowed contempt of all those points on which
we [Christians] differ, and on those about which we agree. 2 63 Jef-
ferson predicted that the rise of liberty of conscience would bring
about the decline of orthodox Christianity and usher in an era of
rational religion. 64 Burke, by contrast, wrote that general tolera-
tion would "encrease real Zeal, Christian fervour, and pious emu-
lation" and that it would never "introduce indifference. 2 6
160 Letter fiom Edmund Burke to Richard Burke, Esq., on Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland
(1793), in 6 Works 385, 394.
261 Burke, Tract on the Popery Laws (circa 1761), in 6 Works 299, 334.
161 Id at 341.
161 Letter frmn Edmund Burke to Thomas Hussey, in 8 Correspondence 245, 246.
"6 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26, 1822), in Paul
Leicester Ford, ed, 12 The Works of ThomasJefferson 243 (Knickerbocker, 1905); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Smith (Dec 8, 1822), in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds,
The Life and Selected Witings of Thomas Jefferson 703 (Random House, 1944).
'"' Letter fin Edmund Burke to William Burgh (Feb 9, 1775), in 3 Correspondence 110,
112.
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Burke's advocacy of toleration was never based on the view that
religion is unimportant or injurious. He maintained that "the glo-
rious and distinguishing prerogative of humanity [is] that of being
a religious creature, 266 and was contemptuous of those who toler-
ated because of indifference: "[t]hat those persons should tolerate
all opinions, who think none to be of estimation, is a matter of
small merit. Equal neglect is not impartial kindness. '2 67 Burke is
not like Jefferson, who based his toleration on the proposition that
"it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty
gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg. '2 68
True toleration, Burke said, is the toleration of those who "think
the dogmas of religion, though in different degrees, are all of mo-
ment, and that amongst them there is, as amongst all things of
value, a just ground of preference. They favor, and therefore they
tolerate. '2
69
In some ways, therefore, Burke sounded more American than
Jefferson did. The American struggle for religious freedom was led
by religious enthusiasts rather than religious rationalists. The
United States never associated religious freedom with anticlerical-
ism, as in France. The emphasis here was always more on freedom
of religion than on freedom from religion. But Burke's advocacy
of toleration was not based on the same principles as that of the
evangelical separationists. For the most part, the advocates of that
position were sectarians, firmly convinced of the correctness of
their theological position and imbued with a zeal for spreading the
gospel as they understood it. For them, toleration was based on
the theological principle that the moving force in the formation
of Christian faith must be the calling of God (in the Calvinist
camp) or the free will of the believer (in the Arminian camp)-
but not the hand of government. 20 By contrast, Burke's toleration
was ecumenical in spirit, based on the intrinsic worth of all reli-
266 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 35.
267 Burke, Reflections at 132.
161 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 159 (Norton, 1955) (originally pub-
lished 1787).
269 Burke, Reflections at 132.
270 See, for example, Issac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty (1773), in
Ellis Sandoz, ed, Political Sermons of the American Founding Era 1730-1805 327 (Liberty,
1991).
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gious positions. True toleration, according to Burke, is based on
the conviction that the "serious religion[s], natural or revealed, 271
all share a common faith in the sovereignty of God and the immu-
table principles of morality and justice. The English, Burke said,
"would reverently and affectionately protect all religions because
they love and venerate the great principle upon which they all
agree, and the great object to which they are all directed. 272
"[H]ave as many sorts of religion as you find in your country; there
is a reasonable worship in them all."2 73 Arguments for toleration
were based more on an ecumenical evaluation of the worth of reli-
gion than on the inherent and sacred primacy of conscience.
As the French Revolution unfolded, Burke became alarmed at
the connection between what he called "fanatical atheism"274 and
the spread of Jacobinism, which he considered the greatest of all
threats to the constitution, to liberty, order, and religion, and all
the more convinced that revealed religion is a vital protection
against totalitarianism. He could not, therefore, view religion as a
purely private matter, bereft of political significance, as Enlighten-
ment reformers were wont to do. Rather, he developed a theory
in which toleration was part of a general strategy, together with
establishment, to maintain the social and cultural preconditions for
limited government.
C. BURKE'S DISAVOWAL OF TOLERATION TO ATHEISTS
Like John Locke before him,27 Burke disavowed toleration of
atheists. "They are never, never to be supported, never to be toler-
ated."276 Atheism, he maintained, was "the most horrid and cruel
blow that can be offered to civil society. '27 7 Of all Burke's posi-
tions, this is the one that seems most foreign to American princi-
"7 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 37.
"I Burke, Reflections at 132.
273 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 36.
"' Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796-97), in 5 Works 231, 363.
27s See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 The Works of John Locke 1, 46-
47 (cited in note 224).
'16 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 36.
' Id.
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ples, the least defensible, the least consistent with a liberal society.
In one of the more sensible statements in Everson v Board of Educa-
tion, the Court declared that the state "cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists,
Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of
public welfare legislation." '278 In our tradition, protection of free-
dom of religion includes freedom not to believe. How can Burke's
intolerance toward atheists be understood?
First, it is worth noting that acceptance of atheism as within the
principle of freedom of religion is a nineteenth-century develop-
ment, even in this country. In his studies of the Founders' views
on religious liberty, Professor Philip Kurland found "no evidence
that they were equally concerned with freedom for irreligion.
Quite to the contrary, they sought to protect man's relation to
his god." '79 Indeed, members of Congress engaged in drafting and
proposing the Bill of Rights stated that they hoped "the amend-
ment would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of con-
science, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to
patronise those who professed no religion at all,"28 and during the
course of deliberating over constitutional exemptions from com-
pulsory militia service it was said that "I do not mean to deprive
[those who are religiously scrupulous in this respect] of any indul-
gence the law affords; my design is to guard against those who are
of no religion."28' It was not until the middle of the nineteenth
century that courts began to recognize atheists and nonbelievers
as having rights of religious freedom.282
Second, Burke made clear that he did not, and could not, sup-
port measures against nonbelievers on religious grounds, but only
if they behaved as a political faction, threatening violence to the
constitution. The only legitimate basis for restraint upon religious
freedom, he said, is that "the person dissenting does not dissent
from the scruples of ill-informed conscience, but from a party
278 Eve7son, 330 US at 16 (emphasis in original).
... Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 Wm &
Mary L Rev 839, 856 (1986).
18  Annals of Congress 730 (Aug 15, 1789) (remarks of Representative Huntington).
281 Id at 767 (Aug 20, 1789) (remarks of Representative Scott).
282 See Lash, 28 Ariz St L J (forthcoming 1996) (cited in note 193).
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ground of dissension, in order to raise a faction in the state." '283
On the floor of Parliament, Burke read from the "political cate-
chism" of the Unitarians to show that it "contained no precept of
religion whatsoever," but was "one continued invective against
kings and bishops." '284 He claimed that the religious assemblies of
the Unitarians had been "turned into places of exercise and disci-
pline for politicks; and for the nourishment of a party which seems
to have contention and power much more than Piety for its Ob-
ject," and which "is proceeding systematically, to the destruction
of this Constitution in some of its essential parts.""28 Indeed, it
was Burke's belief that atheists, if they could only seize political
power as they had in France, would "not leave to religion even a
toleration.12 6 The goal of "fanatical" atheism is the "utter extirpa-
tion of religion." '287 The closest modem analogy is not to toleration
of atheists, but to recognition of the Communist Party-a faction
that, if it could seize power, would extirpate the freedoms of
others.
Third, we should recognize that Burke's intemperate rhetoric
against toleration of atheists was not connected with any program
of actual persecution. Atheists were excluded from certain public
and corporate offices, but in this they were treated no worse than
any other Dissenters from the Church of England. Indeed, in some
respects, atheists were in a less disadvantaged position than reli-
gious Dissenters (other than so-called "Orthodox Dissenters" who
fell within the ambit of the Act of Toleration), since the latter
could be punished for public acts of worship or preaching. No
such strictures applied to atheists, since they did not engage in
worship.288 Indeed, it is not clear that the rights of atheists were
283 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 30.
... Burke, Speech on Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (Mar 2, 1790), in 28 Parliamen-
tay History 432, 436-37.
285 Letterfrmn Edmund Burke to Richard Bright (Feb 18, 1790), in 6 Correspondence 82, 83-
84.
28 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 37. See also Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), 7 Works 39,
48.
287 Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796-97), in 5 Works 231, 361-64.
2' Burke commented on the fact that non-orthodox Dissenters were treated less favorably
than atheists in his Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in
7 Works 21, 33-35.
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dramatically different in Britain than the United States, even to-
day. While atheism is often recognized as a "religion," it is un-
likely that atheists could claim that they have any duties or de-
mands arising from their nonbelief (which is not to say that they
do not have moral duties arising from some nonreligious philo-
sophical source, but that is not the same thing as to say that these
arise from their religious beliefs). According, it is unlikely that
atheists would have occasion to assert free exercise rights. For the
most part, the religious freedom interests of atheists are protected
not as a matter of free exercise, but as an aspect of nonestablish-
ment-and for Establishment Clause purposes it is irrelevant what
the nature of the claimant's beliefs (or lack thereof) may be. Thus,
in this country, as in Burke's England, atheists have no significant
rights in their capacity as atheists.
But these observations only mitigate the significance of the dif-
ference between Burke and the modem American posture toward
toleration of atheists. We must consider, as well, his justification.
Burke's principal argument was that toleration is a form of benefit
to Dissenters on account of the belief that all "positive religion '289
has a certain worth, on account of its recognition of enduring prin-
ciples of right and justice. Atheism, being mere negation, lacks this
quality, and indeed fosters a spirit of anarchy.290 He did not con-
sider intolerance toward atheism as intolerance toward a reli-
gion-but toward a denial of religion. Thus, he could say: "At the
same time that I would cut up the very root of atheism, I would
respect all conscience,-all conscience that is really such. 29' By
his premises, therefore, exclusion of atheists and nonbelievers from
toleration was not based on hatred or prejudice, but on legitimate
differences. If toleration is extended to dissenting believers out of
a recognition that their affirmative belief contributes to the com-
mon good by reinforcing the ties of immutable justice and moral-
ity, then there is no reason to treat mere unbelief, mere "nega-
tion," in the same way. It may well be that certain affirmative
philosophical beliefs held by atheists have a status that should be
recognized as tantamount to religion,292 but bare atheism, without
2" Burke, Letter on the Affairs ofIreland (1797), in 6 Works 413, 426 (emphasis in original).
290 Id.
29 Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 36.
292 As the Supreme Court suggested in Welsh v United States, 398 US 333 (1970).
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more, does not promote the habits of mind and spirit that entitle
"serious religion" to a heightened degree of respect.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TOLERATION
AND ESTABLISHMENT
The central preoccupation of Burke's political thought is
with the restraint of power. As Conor Cruise O'Brien has empha-
sized in his recent biography, the animating theme-what he calls,
after Yeats, the "Great Melody"-of Burke's career was his oppo-
sition to the abuse of power: in the American colonies, Ireland,
France, and India.2 93 In each of these situations, men in authority
over others, but not restrained by the authority of the law, exer-
cised essentially unlimited power, to the detriment of those in
whose names they were supposed to govern. To others, even to
Burke's usual political allies, these presented different questions
altogether: Whigs typically sympathized with the oppression of the
Indians or the Americans, but optimistically assumed that the un-
bridled power of the revolutionaries in France would be liberating.
To Burke, the "malignancy" was the same:
I think I can hardly overrate the malignity of the principles of
Protestant ascendancy ... as they affect these countries, and
as they affect Asia,-or ofJacobinism, as they affect all Europe
and the state of human society itself. The last is the greatest
evil. But it readily combines with the others, and flows from
them.294
Arbitrary power is the polar opposite of the constitution of free-
dom; legitimate government is more than the mere will of the sov-
ereign. In a speech directed against the claim by Warren Hastings
of "arbitrary power" over the people of India, Burke declaimed:
[A]rbitrary power is a thing which neither any man can hold
nor any man can give. No man can lawfully govern himself
according to his own will; much less can one person be gov-
erned by the will of another. We are all born in subjection,-
all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in sub-
jection to one great, immutable, preexistent law, prior to all
293 O'Brien, The Great Melody at xxiii (cited in note 13).
214 Second Letter frmn Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Catholic Question (May
26, 1795), in 6 Works 375, 379.
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our devices and prior to all our contrivances, paramount to all
our ideas and all our sensations, antecedent to our very exis-
tence, by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame
of the universe, out of which we cannot stir.295
In his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, Burke wrote: "Neither
the few nor the many have a right to act merely by their will, in
any matter connected with duty, trust, engagement, or obliga-
tion. '296 Thus, to Burke, "the important, but at the same time the
difficult problem to the true statesman," is to use "moral instruc-
tion" and "civil constitutions" to impose restraint on the immod-
erate exercise of power.2 97
Burke understood religion-the consciousness of that "great,
immutable, pre-existing law" to which he appealed in his speech
against Hastings-to be essential to the restraint of power. With-
out religion, "it is utterly impossible," according to Burke, that
those in power (whether monarchs, aristocrats, or the people)
should "empt[y] themselves of all the lust of selfish will."'2 9 Knowl-
edge that God's will is superior to man's is the strongest security
against the possibility that the people might imagine that their will
"is the standard of right and wrong."'2 99 Thus, "[a]ll persons pos-
sessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully im-
pressed with an idea that they act in trust, and that they are to
account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master,
Author, and Founder of society. '"300
For most people within a society, the established church is the
best guarantor of this sensibility of restraint. The Church of En-
gland reflects and represents the long-standing beliefs of the major
part of the nation, and thus speaks with the authority of prescrip-
tion. Such a religion, Burke maintained, is "well fitted to the frame
and pattern of your [the English] civil constitution"; it is a "barrier
against fanaticism, infidelity, and atheism"; it "furnishes support
29 Edmund Burke, Speech in Opening the Impeachment of Warren Hastings (Feb 16, 1788),
in 9 Works 396, 455.
296 Burke, An Appeal fi'om the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57, 162.
'9' Id at 163-64.
29 Burke, Reflections at 83.
219 Id at 82.
110Id at 81.
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to the human mind in the afflictions and distresses of the world,
consolation in sickness, pain, poverty, and death"; and it "dignifies
our nature with the hope of immortality, leaves inquiry free, whilst
it preserves an authority to teach, where authority only can
teach." 0' "[T]his national Church Establishment is a great na-
tional benefit," he said, "a great public blessing."3 °2 Indeed, Burke
maintained, the English people "do not consider their church es-
tablishment as convenient, but as essential to their state." It is "the
foundation of their whole constitution. "303
But there were some in England and many more in Ireland who,
for reasons of conscience and conviction, adhered to a religious
faith other than that established by law. They, too, deserved the
support and encouragement of the law. Their articles of faith may
contain error (as, indeed, the established church may contain er-
ror), but all religions impart some measure of the truth of the sov-
ereignty of God and therefore the restraint of man. "Do not pro-
mote diversity," Burke thus advised, but "when you have it, bear
it; have as many sorts of religion as you find in your country; there
is a reasonable worship in them all.''3°4 Burke declared that he
would "never call any religious opinions, which appear important
to serious and pious minds, things of no consideration.... As long
as men hold charity and justice to be essential integral parts of
religion, there can be little danger from a strong attachment to
particular tenets in faith."3 °0
Moreover, any attempt to root out dissenting faiths and replace
them with the established church is likely to prove not just unsuc-
cessful, but counterproductive. It is easier to destroy faith than to
replace it with another. This is what Burke saw to be the conse-
quence of the persecution of Catholics in Ireland, where the Penal
Laws were "partly leading, partly driving into Jacobinism that de-
scription of [the Irish] people whose religious principles, church
01 Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 Works 39, 57.
"I Id at 56.
3' Burke, Reflections at 87.
3" Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 36.
3's Letter from Edmund Burke to William Smith, Esq., on the Subject of Catholic Emancipation
(Jan 29, 1795), in 6 Works 361, 365.
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polity, and habitual discipline might make them an invincible dike
against that inundation.""3 6 This persecution, to Burke, is "mad-
ness and folly." There is no conceivable justification for "driving
men ... from any positive religion whatever into the irreligion of
the times, and its sure concomitant principles of anarchy."0 7
In these circumstances, Burke maintained that differences
among religions must take second seat to the more important con-
flict between religion and its detractors. "If ever the Church and
the Constitution of England should fall in these islands," he wrote,
"it is not Presbyterian discipline nor Popish hierarchy that will
rise upon their ruins .... It is the new fanatical religion, now in
the heat of its first ferment, of the Rights of Man, which rejects
all establishments, all discipline, all ecclesiastical, and in truth all
civil order, which will triumph . ,,"0' It was therefore just as
important to tolerate and protect conscientious members of other
faiths as it was to support the established church. He responded
to a member of Parliament who opposed extension of toleration
to those whom Burke called "conscientious Dissenter[s]": 9
The honorable gentleman would have us fight this confederacy
of the powers of darkness with the single arm of the Church
of England,-would have us not only fight against infidelity,
but fight at the same time with all the faith in the world except
our own.
310
The spread of Jacobinism-along with a rising spirit of rebel-
lion-in Ireland gave Burke's advocacy against the Protestant As-
cendancy a new urgency. Catholicism ought to be a force for sta-
bility and order, but persecution was turning Catholics into allies
of revolution. He wrote to an Irish parliamentarian that "in Ireland
particularly the Roman Catholic religion.., ought to be cherished
as a good, (though not as the most preferable good, if a choice
"o' Second Letter fi-om Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Catholic Question (May
26, 1795), in 6 Works 375, 380-81.
3" Burke, Letter on the Affairs of Ireland (1797), in 6 Works 413, 426 (emphasis in original).
311 Letter fio Edmund Burke to Richard Burke, Esq. on Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland
(1793), in 6 Works 385, 398.
I" Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters (Mar 17, 1773), in 7 Works
21, 35.
"I Id at 37.
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was now to be made,) and not tolerated as an inevitable evil." As
matters stand, "the serious and earnest belief and practice of [Ca-
tholicism] by its professors forms .. .the most effectual barrier,
if not the sole barrier, against Jacobinism." 3" But instead, as he
wrote to another member of the (Protestant) Irish Parliament, the
suppression of Catholicism is "driving the people in precisely the
opposite direction.""' 2 He elaborated:
You make a sad story of the Pope. 0 seri studiorum! It will
not be difficult to get many called Catholics to laugh at this
fundamental part of their religion. Never doubt it. You have
succeeded in part, and you may succeed completely. But in the
present state of men's minds and affairs, do not flatter your-
selves that they will piously look to the head of our Church
in the place of that Pope whom you make them forswear, and
out of all reverence to whom you bully and rail and buffoon
them. Perhaps you may succeed in the same manner with all
the other tenets of doctrine and usages of discipline amongst
the Catholics; but what security have you, that, in the temper
and on the principles on which they have made this change,
they will stop at the exact sticking-places you have marked in
your articles? You have no security for anything, but that they
will become what are called Franco-acobins, and reject the
whole together.3
This was Burke's nightmare: the Protestant Ascendancy and the
principles of the French Revolution, tyranny and anarchy, advanc-
ing hand-in-hand in Ireland, and nothing he could do seemed to
make any difference.
In Burke's constitution of freedom, toleration and establishment
were not inconsistent principles, but alternative strategies for at-
taining the same objective: to nurture and strengthen the religious
sensibilities that are the best and most reliable source of moral
restraint. Burke strove his entire life to uphold constitutional prin-
ciples of balanced government and incremental change that would
protect against the dangers of arbitrary power. But in the end, he
311 Letter from Edmund Burke to William Smith, Esq., on the Subject of Catholic Emancipation
(Jan 29, 1795), in 6 Works 361, 369.
31 Second Letter fiom Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Catholic Question (May
26, 1795), in 6 Works 375, 380-81.
3,3 Id at 381 (emphasis in original).
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said, quoting Virgil's Aeneid, "[w]e have but this one appeal against
irresistible power-
If you have no respect for the human race and mortal arms,
Yet beware the gods who remember right and wrong.3 14
114 Burke, An Appeal fr'om the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 4 Works 57, 165. Burke
quoted, of course, in Latin.
